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INTRODUCTION
Called "ingenious"' and "uniquely complicated," 2 share-
holder derivative litigation has sparked considerable contro-
versy since its inception 150 years ago.3 These remarkable suits
permit shareholders to sue derivatively on their corporation's
behalf.4 The litigation's controversial nature results from the
competing tensions underlying such unusual relief. One per-
spective embraces derivative suits as an invaluable procedural
vehicle permitting shareholders to champion their corporation's
rights when corporate management refuses to do so. The op-
posing view cautions that corporations, not the courts, should
resolve internal conflicts, and that derivative litigation neces-
sarily raises the specter of shareholder strike suits5 and undue
1. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 15.1 (1986) (calling the share-
holder derivative suit "one of the most interesting and ingenious of accounta-
bility mechanisms for large formal organizations").
2. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1:01 (1987) (noting that "[d]erivative litigation is a uniquely com-
plicated form of civil litigation, in part simply because the real party in inter-
est in the litigation, the corporation, is not the plaintiff").
3. Shareholder derivative suits on behalf of joint stock corporations ex-
isted in nineteenth-century England. Id. § 1:03.
4. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (noting
that the derivative shareholder "step[s] into the corporation's shoes"); Hawes
v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881) (noting that derivative suits are "founded
on a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the corpora-
tion itself is the appropriate plaintiff"); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXAN-
DER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 360, at
1044-45 (1983) (noting that shareholders sue derivatively "[w]hen the corporate
cause of action is for some reason not asserted by the corporation itself").
5. "Strike suits" are "those based on reckless charges and brought for
personal gain." CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.2.
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judicial interference with the business judgments of
management.
These competing views have spawned a variety of complex
procedural requirements and equally complex judicial dilem-
mas regarding derivative litigation.6 The principal quandaries
involve requirements for shareholder demand and the appro-
priate judicial review of corporate management's response to
that demand. The shareholder demand requirement, perhaps
the best known barrier to derivative suits, squarely presents
"the struggle between shareholder control and director control
over the corporation's power to bring and pursue a lawsuit."
7
Virtually all United States jurisdictions require that a share-
holder make a pre-suit demand, unless excused as futile, on the
corporation's board of directors.8 Judicial confusion surround-
ing the application of the futility exception to the demand re-
quirement has enjoyed disproportionate prominence in
derivative litigation.9 In addition, courts have struggled over
what degree of deference to accord management's response to
shareholder demands.10 Courts are torn between acquiescence
to the business acumen of boards seeking discontinuance of a
suit and the desire to explore the shareholder's allegations of
corporate wrongdoing on the merits.11 Special litigation com-
mittees have only heightened the controversy by shifting the
balance dramatically in management's favor.12 These dilemmas
have generated unprecedented legal developments over the
past decade and remain "the focus of considerable discussion by
academics and commentators, and in courtrooms, state legisla-
tures, and boardrooms.' 3
Since 1978, the Corporate Governance Project of the Amer-
ican Law Institute ("ALI")-sometimes called the most elite
6. See DEMOTT, supra note 2, § 1:01.
7. CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.2.
8. Id.
9. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 655 (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter ALI
FINAL DRAFT] (noting that the futility doctrine creates threshold litigation col-
lateral to the action's merits, slowing the pace and increasing the cost of deriv-
ative actions).
10. See id. at 596-98.
11. See id. at 587.
12. See James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Deriva-
tive Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J.
959, 961.
13. See Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in
Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAw. 469, 469 (1990).
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group of lawyers in the United States' 4-has labored over find-
ing the appropriate balance between management and share-
holder rights in derivative suits.15 Throughout this enormous
task, competing business law factions vied to tip the scales in
their own favor.16 After fourteen years of difficult delibera-
tions, the ALI's struggles culminated in the Proposed Final
Draft, approved in May 1992, which attempts to balance the
competing perspectives.17 The unveiling of the Corporate Gov-
ernance Project's recommendations provides an important op-
portunity to revisit the significant issues underlying
shareholder demand and judicial review in derivative litigation.
Beginning with an analytical overview of the purposes and
development of shareholder derivative suits, pre-suit demand,
and judicial review, this Article plunges into the very complex
ALI proposals. It evaluates the principal ALI derivative suit
provisions in light of the Corporate Governance Project's stated
purposes,' 8 including the Reporter's' 9 supporting analyses and
14. Jonathan R. Macey, Naderite Mossbacks Lose Control Over Corporate
Law, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1992, at A21.
15. The ALI describes the conflict inherent in derivative litigation as
follows:
[C]ompeting considerations need to be balanced. On the one hand,
the availability of legal recourse is essential if management's obliga-
tions to its shareholders are to constitute more than a precatory body
of law. Some judicial mechanism for the enforcement of fiduciary du-
ties must therefore exist that is external to the corporation. On the
other hand, few intracorporate transactions are not susceptible to dif-
ferences of opinion; nor are courts infallible. Thus, the corporate di-
rector might have reason to view his position as exposed and
vulnerable if every transaction or alleged omission subjected him to
the prospect of significant liability at the behest of a single
shareholder.
ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, at 587.
16. The "struggle," as described by Cornell law professor Jonathan R. Ma-
cey, was essentially between the "law and economics movement" and the tra-
ditionalists. Macey, supra note 14, at A21. The traditional view espoused by
the "distinguished older scholars at the helm of the project" saw shareholders
as "pawns ruthlessly exploited by management." Id. Those reflecting the new
market-oriented perspective feared that any transference of authority from di-
rectors and markets to lawyers and courts would threaten the corporate free
enterprise system. Id.
17. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, at 587. At the 1992 annual meeting
in Washington on May 12-15, the ALI members ratified the derivative suit sec-
tions with relatively minor amendments. See ALI Wraps Up Corporation Law
Projectf,] Works on Lawyer Ethics, Complex Trials, 60 U.S.L.W. 2727, 2727-28
(1992). Final approval by the ALI governing council is expected. Id. at 2727.
18. This Article will principally focus on those sections presenting the
ALI's position on shareholder demand, ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03,
and judicial standard of review, id. §§ 7.07-.10.
19. The Reporter for the relevant sections of the Corporate Governance
1342 [Vol. 77:1339
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the resulting recommendations. The fourteen-year project rep-
resents a herculean effort; the immense volume20 provides a
comprehensive overview of important and complex business
law issues. Since ALI principles serve as nonbinding recom-
mendations for state legislatures and for courts applying state
corporation law,2 1 the question now is the extent to which to-
day's courts and legislatures will-and indeed should-follow
the ALI's suggestions. Ultimately, this Article contends that
the ALI's massive undertaking represents an opportunity lost.
Although wisely advocating universal demand,2 2 the ALI's pro-
posed standards for substantive review of management's recom-
mendations are unworkable and too deferential to
corporations.23 Given the dissatisfaction with the ALI ap-
proach, then, the Article concludes by exploring what stan-
dards might guide most effectively the delicate balance between
the rights of shareholders and boards of directors. Joining the
strong modern trend of endorsing universal demand, the Arti-
cle then proposes a simplified hybrid standard of judicial re-
view. Like the Corporate Governance Project, the suggested
approach attempts to balance the dangers of strike suits with
the undeniable need for ensuring meaningful shareholder ac-
cess to the courts. Unlike the ALI's final proposal, however,
this Article advocates a unitary standard that promotes the im-
portant values of clarity and flexibility, thus permitting share-
holders key access to the courts while providing the necessary
deference to the recommendations of corporate management.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR DERIVATIVE
SUIT ISSUES
A. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS
Derivative actions date from the early nineteenth century,
when English courts began recognizing an equitable jurisdiction
for shareholder suits.2 Such litigation "has never existed in a
Project was John C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University. Id.
at v.
20. The Proposed Final Draft of Principles of Corporate Governance runs
1068 pages; Part VII, Chapter 1 discussing derivative suits itself is 260 pages in
length.
21. See ALI Wraps up Corporation Law Projectf,] Works on Lawyer Eth-
ics, Complex Trials, supra note 17, at 2727.
22. See ALI FINAL DRAFr, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 654-57.
23. Professor Macey concluded that the ALI report honestly reflected the
"push and pull" of competing interests. See Macey, supra note 14, at A19.
24. DEMOTT, supra note 2, § 1:03. Historically, courts treated derivative
1993] 1343
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social or legal vacuum";25 its creation directly responded to in-
vestors' needs resulting from the Industrial Revolution.26 By
1855, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the
existence of derivative suits could be "no longer doubted. '2 7
Derivative suits afford a truly extraordinary form of re-
lief.28 In shareholder derivative litigation, "an oppressed mi-
nority shareholder assumes the mantle of the corporation itself
to right wrongs committed by those temporarily in control of
the corporation's destiny."29  Unlike direct actions in which
plaintiffs seek redress for injuries they themselves have sus-
tained, shareholders in derivative actions sue to redress injuries
sustained by the corporation.30 The corporation's injury has
only a derivative impact on its shareholders, who own the busi-
suits as being "two suits in one"--the first by the plaintiff shareholder seeking
an equitable order compelling the corporation to bring a second action for
legal damages. This historical notion survives in the current custom of making
the corporation a nominal defendant and permitting the corporation to raise
various objections. CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.1.
25. DEMOTr, supra note 2, § 1:03.
26. Id. As England became increasingly industrialized, holdings in joint
stock corporations became more dispersed, and the inevitable conflicts be-
tween shareholders and managers prompted judicial recognition of the need
for representative suits. Id; see also Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders' De-
rivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 982 (1957).
27. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341 (1855). Shareholder de-
rivative suits in the United States are reported as early as 1832. DEMOTT,
supra note 2, § 1:03 (citing Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)).
28. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983). Derivative suits are
an exception to the "usual rule that the proper party to bring a claim on be-
half of a corporation is the corporation itself." Block et al., supra note 13, at
472 (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 531-32 (1984)).
29. 1 ROGER J. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 8.01, at 2 (1992).
These suits permit nominal plaintiffs to champion the cause of an artificial
entity:
Such actions are rooted both in metaphysics and in common
sense. The corporation as a person, albeit a fictitious one, has a life
and interests distinct from those of its temporary managers. Those
who control it must do so with good faith and exercise good steward-
ship. If they do not, a minority shareholder may come to the corpora-
tion's defense as a representative of its true interests.
Id.
30. This is the traditional common law distinction between derivative and
direct suits. ALI FINAL DRAFr, supra note 9, § 7.01 cmts. a, c. Thus,
a wrongful act that depletes corporate assets and thereby injures
shareholders only indirectly, by reason of the prior injury to the cor-
poration, should be seen as derivative in character; conversely, a
wrongful act that is separate and distinct from any corporate injury,
such as one that denies or interferes with the rightful incidents of
share ownership, gives rise to a direct action.
Id. cmt. c. Although there are various tests for distinguishing between direct
and derivative claims, courts generally reach substantially similar results. See
1344 [Vol. 77:1339
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ness through their shares of stock.31 Thus, the corporation-
the true party in interest-is not the plaintiff.32
Shareholder derivative plaintiffs can assert legal rights
against a variety of possible wrongdoers--directors, manage-
ment, other shareholders, or even third persons who have dam-
aged the corporate entity.33  Often, the defendants are
corporate insiders who have injured the business, either by in-
tentional abuse of the corporate form for personal gain or by
negligent "garden variety mismanagement. '34
Given the tensions inherent in shareholder derivative liti-
gation, both courts and commentators are understandably am-
bivalent about its overall social utility.35 Viewed idealistically,
judges naturally want to encourage noble "corporate knights"
rushing to protect innocent shareholders from the "designing
schemes and wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their
company's interests in order to enrich themselves. '36 Actual
experience has shown, however, that the social costs sometimes
outweigh the benefits.37
Shareholder derivative suits, like all tort actions, arguably
serve two principal goals: compensation and deterrence. Ab-
sent derivative suits, individual shareholders would have no ac-
cess to compensation for injuries directly inflicted on their
corporation. 38 Thus, the ALI has recently acknowledged that
"the derivative action may offer the only effective remedy in
those circumstances where a control group has the ability to en-
gage in self-dealing transactions with the corporation."39 Em-
id; John W. Welch, Shareholders Individual and Derivative Actions: Underly-
ing Rationales and the Closely Held Corporation, 9 J. CORP. L. 147, 154 (1984).
31. Any damages recovery in a shareholder derivative suit accordingly
goes to the corporate coffers, not to the individual shareholder plaintiff. See
ALl FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.01 cmt. d, at 606.
32. See DEMOTT, supra note 2, § 1:01, at 1.
33. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); see also Chester B.
McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 GEo. L.J. 878, 897
(1938).
34. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 2. Typically, derivative suits
target self-serving officers or directors for breaching their fiduciary duties in a
variety of corporate settings. See id. § 8.04, at 8-9 (listing 14 "obvious exam-
ples" of wrongdoing in shareholder derivative actions). Direct shareholder
suits, in contrast, include actions to enforce voting rights, to compel dividends,
to prevent oppression of minority shareholders, and to compel dissolution. See
ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.01 cmt. c, at 604.
35. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 3.
36. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
37. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, at 588.
38. See Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024, 1034 (Neb. 1903).
39. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, at 588.
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pirical studies, however, paint conflicting pictures of how
effectively shareholder derivative litigation compensates plain-
tiffs. 40  Although commentators generally agree that most
shareholders ultimately succeed in the sense that they obtain
some recovery,41 it is less clear whether the overall level of suc-
cess is significant.4 2
Regarding the deterrence goal, courts and commentators
have advocated derivative suits as a way to curb managerial
misconduct.43 They have justified derivative suits on deter-
rence grounds even in the absence of provable money dam-
ages." Because numerous factors provide deterrence pressures,
40. The ALI summarized the inconclusive statistics as follows:
The existing state of the empirical data does not answer many im-
portant questions. First, it does not tell us whether derivative actions
yield on average a net compensatory benefit for the corporation ....
Second, although the data shows little evidence of any recent explo-
sion in the rate of shareholder litigation and suggests that such litiga-
tion only infrequently concerns business decisions not complicated by
an alleged conflict of interest, it is possible that directors' perception
of such litigation may be very different, and it is the perceived threat
that may shape their willingness to serve on boards. Finally, recent
institutional changes-such as the decreased availability of liability in-
surance and the increased incidence of takeover contests-may not be
reflected in historical data.
ALI FNAL DRAFT, supra note 9, reporter's note at 596. See George D. Horn-
stein, The Death Knell of Stockholders'Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CAL.
L. REV. 123 (1944) (discussing findings which concluded that the costs of deriv-
ative suits outweighed their benefits); Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Exami-
nation of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits,
60 B.U. L. REV. 542, 545 (1980) (noting that shareholder plaintiffs obtain some
relief in 75% of cases); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991) (emphasizing the rel-
ative infrequency of derivative suits and the importance of settlement).
41. Most derivative suits are ultimately dismissed or settled. DEMOTT,
supra note 2, § 1:01. Compensation, of course, means more than the receipt of
money. The shareholder plaintiff's victory might consist of management's
agreement to reform the corporation's structures or policies to redress plain-
tiff's grievances.
42. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, reporter's note at 592-96.
43. The ALI has recently noted that "properly structured derivative suits
may enhance management accountability by: (1) ensuring a measure of judi-
cial oversight, (2) providing for a remedy that does not depend upon the ability
of widely dispersed shareholders to take coordinated action, and (3) protecting
the market for corporate control from unreasonable interferences." Id. at 588.
Derivative actions may also serve key educational and socializing functions by
clarifying the duties of corporate management in a variety of contexts. Id. re-
porter's note at 596-97; see also George D. Hornstein, Future of Corporate Con-
trol, 63 HARv. L. REV. 476 (1950) (noting that the availability of derivative suits
deters managerial wrongdoing).
44. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, reporter's note at 597. The New York
Court of Appeals expressed this deterrence benefit in the following way:
1346 [Vol. 77:1339
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however, commentators disagree about the role derivative suits
play. Stating that "the derivative action is neither the initial
nor the primary protection for shareholders against managerial
misconduct, ' 45 the ALI concludes that derivative actions enjoy
"only a limited role... as a mechanism of corporate accounta-
bility. '46 Regardless of how effective their deterrent impact,
derivative suits nonetheless may reduce efficiently the average
agency costs that shareholders must incur to hold management
accountable. 47
[D]amages to the corporation .. . halve] never been considered to be
an essential requirement for a cause of action founded on a breach of
fiduciary duty .... This is because the function of such an action...
is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed by the
defendant but . . . "to prevent them, by removing from agents and
trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit in
matters which they have undertaken for others, or to which their
agency or trust relates."
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (quoting Dutton v.
Willner, 52 N.Y. 312, 319 (1873)); see also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (recognizing that shareholder litigation renders "substan-
tial service to the corporation and its shareholders" even if the benefit has no
monetary value). The goal of deterrence, however, should not permit a plain-
tiff's unjust enrichment. See ALI FINAL DRAFr, supra note 9, reporter's note
at 598-99 (quoting Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R.,
417 U.S. 703, 717 (1974) ("If deterrence were the only objective, then in logic
any plaintiff willing to file a complaint would suffice.")).
45. ALl FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, at 587. The ALI acknowledged that
other forces may be at least as effective in deterring corporate management
misconduct:
A variety of social and market forces also operate to hold corporate
officials accountable: the professional standards of managers, over-
sight by outside directors, the disciplinary power of the market, and
shareholder voting-all these mechanisms plus the regulatory author-
ity of governmental agencies would constitute significant protections
in the absence of private litigation. Even if dissatisfied shareholders
had no other recourse than to sell their shares, such action, taken col-
lectively, might also inhibit managerial overreaching, to the extent it
depressed the value of the corporation's stock, which management
typically also holds. Yet, no single technique of accountability (in-
cluding market and legal remedies) is likely to be optimal under all
circumstances.
Id. at 587-88.
46. Id. at 589.
47. Id. reporter's note at 599-601. The ALI describes this reduction of
agency costs as follows:
Both because the plaintiff's attorney is typically a specialist in such
litigation and because shareholder coordination is not necessary in the
case of the derivative action, it seems reasonable to believe that the
availability of this action economizes on costs that otherwise would be
necessarily incurred if shareholders were required to take collective
action .... In this light, the derivative action has been viewed as an
efficient solution to the intractable organizational problem that would
1993] 1347
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In contrast to these potentially substantial benefits, courts
and commentators have also long stigmatized derivative litiga-
tion as the "refuge of strike suit artists specializing in corporate
extortion."48 Thus, courts rather grudgingly recognize the ben-
efit of derivative suits while often reciting their dangers.49
Opinions often also recite the judicial inclination to permit the
derivative remedy only under extraordinary circumstances
where a plaintiff has no other means of redress. 50
In addition to inviting strike suits, intracorporate litigation
necessarily entails significant social costs. The ALI's Corporate
Governance Project considers these costs to be serious, noting
that private enforcement by shareholders might "reduce mana-
gerial incentives to take business risks" and that even meritori-
ous actions may motivate inadequate or collusive settlements
that fail to benefit the corporation.51
The resulting tension between shareholder rights and def-
erence to management has given rise to the imposition of sig-
nificant procedural restrictions on derivative suits. Although
courts created the shareholder derivative action, statutes now
play a prominent role in authorizing and regulating such ac-
tions.52  The statutorily-imposed procedural restrictions in
otherwise arise were it necessary to allocate the costs of opposing
management proportionately among all shareholders.
Id. at 600.
48. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 3; see also Note, Extortionate
Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLuM. L. REV. 1308 (1934).
49. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 3 (citing Jones v. Taylor, 348
A.2d 188 (Del. Ch. 1975); Harff v. Kerkovian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975) (per curiam); Rosenthal v.
Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 1948); Shapiro v. Magaziner, 210
A.2d 890 (Pa. 1965)).
50. Id. (citing Bell v. Arnold, 487 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1971); Winter v. Farmers
Educ. & Coop. Union, 107 N.W.2d 226 (1Minn. 1961)).
51. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, at 588-89. The ALI described the
danger of inappropriate settlements in the following manner:
Even in meritorious cases, a private enforcer can reach an inadequate
or even collusive settlement that exchanges a low corporate recovery
for a high award of attorneys' fees that is paid by the corporation.
Unlike most other forms of litigation, where the plaintiff's gain essen-
tially comes at the defendant's expense, the derivative action is a
three-sided litigation with three necessary parties: plaintiff, defend-
ant, and the corporation. As a practical matter, the first two parties
can pass the costs of the litigation onto the third by reaching a settle-
ment that maximizes their own interests, but does not benefit the
corporation.
Id. at 589 (citation omitted). Judicial oversight of derivative suit settlements
reduces the severity of this problem. Id.
52. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, §§ 8.02-.03; Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revi-
val of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 80 (1967). The statutes can
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shareholder derivative actions are multifold;53 the most impor-
tant, however, is the shareholder demand requirement.M
B. SHAREHOLDER DEMAND AND THE FUTILITY EXCEPTION
1. The Demand Requirement
All jurisdictions require that shareholders make a demand
on the corporation's board of directors before a derivative suit
can be brought.55 Most jurisdictions will excuse this require-
ment only when making a demand would be futile.56 The de-
mand requirement is typically embodied in a procedural rule
such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which provides
that a derivative suit complaint must "allege with particularity
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action...
or for not making the effort. '57 Courts have repeatedly noted
that the demand requirement is more than a mere procedural
formality; it is a critically important element of substantive cor-
porate jurisprudence. 58
The purposes underlying the demand requirement all re-
late to the advantages arguably inherent in giving the corpora-
tion notice of the shareholder's allegations prior to litigation.
Perhaps most importantly, demand reflects corporate law's
"fundamental tenet," which holds that directors, not individual
shareholders, manage the business and affairs of corporations.59
A demand gives management the opportunity to address the
be found in state business corporation acts and civil procedure rules. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.1; MAGNUSON, supra note 29, §§ 8.02-.03; Ernest L. Folk, Corpora-
tion Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 929-30.
53. See 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.02. The statutes of most jurisdic-
tions include such requirements as contemporaneous stock ownership, verifica-
tion of pleadings, and security for the corporation's defense expenses. Id. In
addition, many jurisdictions require shareholder notice and court approval for
any settlement, dismissal or compromise of derivative actions. DEMOTT, supra
note 2, § 1:01.
54. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.2.
55. See ALl FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. a. Although courts
initially required that derivative plaintiffs also make demand upon sharehold-
ers, the modern approach eliminates the need for such demand.
56. Id. § 7.03 cmts. a, d.
57. State procedural rules often closely follow the language of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. In addition, the states' business corporation stat-
utes may also expressly address the demand requirement.
58. Block et al., supra note 13, at 471; see, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 809 (Del. 1984) (noting that the demand requirement is a rule of substan-
tive right).
59. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1991); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
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shareholder's allegations. If corporate management believes
the claims have merit, it may choose to pursue corrective ac-
tions or take charge of the litigation.60 If management dis-
agrees with the shareholder's contentions, the demand
requirement gives the corporation the chance to reject the pro-
posed action and, if necessary, seek early dismissal of any re-
lated derivative court suit.61  Regardless of whether the
corporation rejects or supports the shareholder action, the de-
mand may at least motivate the board to consider difficult is-
sues not previously given serious attention.6 2
Thus, requiring pre-suit demand "allows directors to make
a business decision about a business question: whether to in-
vest the time and resources of the corporation in litigation. '6 3
Judge Easterbrook recently described why management's re-
sponse to shareholder demand should be considered just an-
other business decision:
Firms must make operational decisions; if these misfire, they must de-
cide what to do next. Each decision must be made with the interests
of the corporation at heart. Whether to buy a particular combination
of services at a particular price is a business decision. So too the deci-
sion to file a lawsuit about the price or pursue a different course, such
as renegotiating the contract, changing the level of services, even find-
ing a new adviser .... If the directors run the show, then they must
control litigation (versus other remedies) to the same extent as they
make the initial business decision.
64
According to Easterbrook, business executives-not judges-are
trained to make this significant business judgment.6 5
60. See Elfenbein v. Gulf W. Indus., 590 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam). Although they almost never choose to do so, corporations may take
charge of the litigation because of concern that the shareholders will not ob-
tain adequate relief. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. c, at 651.
61. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990).
62. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. c, at 652 (explaining that
demand may induce board to consider issues and crystalize policies); see also
Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 465 U.S. 1001 (1984); Robert K. Payson, Dismissal of Derivative
Actions: The Debate, 6 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 522, 527 (1981).
63. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1342 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook., J.) (citing Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 457, 461-62 (1881)),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Demand in Deriva-
tive Actions: Problems of Interpretation and Function, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
461, 484-88 (1986); Daniel R. Fischel, Comment, The Demand and Standing Re-
quirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168, 171-72
(1976).
64. 908 F.2d at 1342-43; see also Block et al., supra note 13, at 471-72 (citing
Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring)).
65. 908 F.2d at 1343; see also Richard W. Duesenberg, The Business Judg-
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Shareholder demand may also serve the interest of judicial
economy. 66 In theory, the demand requirement promotes intra-
corporate dispute resolution that avoids unnecessary litiga-
tion.67 If management's response addresses the shareholder's
concerns, then the corporation will have successfully resolved
the conflict without implicating the already overburdened judi-
cial system.68
Finally, the demand requirement may also have value inso-
far as it discourages strike suits. 69 Because making a demand
on the board of directors is procedurally quite simple,70 how-
ever, it is unclear how effectively the requirement discourages
meritless shareholder actions.
2. Excusing Demand
Most jurisdictions excuse the demand requirement if the
shareholder can establish that presenting a demand to manage-
ment would be futile.7 1 The standards for determining futility
vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction;72 in fact, futility is-
sues have clogged the courts for decades. As a general rule,
some level of directorial involvement in a challenged transac-
tion excuses demand.73 Courts disagree, however, about how to
apply this basic principle.7 4 The excuse determination some-
ment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside, 60
WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 314 (1982) (the court is "neither trained nor competent" to
second-guess management's business judgment).
66. Block et al., supra note 13, at 472-73.
67. See Starrels, 870 F.2d at 1173 (describing demand as initiating a "form
of alternative dispute resolution"); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del.
1984) (demand requirement "promote[s] intracorporate dispute resolution").
68. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881) (stockholder plain-
tiff must first exhaust "all the means within his reach to obtain, within the
corporation itself, the redress of his grievances"); Cramer v. General Tel. &
Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978) (demand requirement "enables
corporate management to pursue alternative remedies, thus often ending un-
necessary litigation"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
69. Block et al., supra note 13, at 473; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 811-12 (Del. 1984) (describing the demand requirement as a "safeguard
against strike suits").
70. Making a demand requires nothing more than sending a letter
describing the allegations. See 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.10, at 30-31
(describing what a demand should include).
71. The underlying rationale is that a shareholder need not engage in
fruitless behavior.
72. See DEMOTT, supra note 2, § 5.03.
73. ALI FINAL DRAFr, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. d, at 652.
74. I&
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times turns on whether all directors are named as defendants,75
whether the alleged wrongdoers constitute a majority of the
board,76 or whether a demand would likely prod the directors
into corrective action.77 Even among these general approaches,
each state jurisdiction tends to have a slightly different
formula.78
Delaware has applied a particularly complex test for deter-
mining demand futility.79 The determination presents alterna-
tive inquiries, as the Delaware Supreme Court recently
articulated: "(1) whether threshold presumptions of director
disinterest or independence are rebutted by well-pleaded facts;
and, if not, (2) whether the complaint pleads particularized
facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the challenged
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judg-
ment."8' 0 The latter standard, which has been called the "rea-
sonable doubt" test,8 ' invites a certain amount of judicial
subjectivity in determining futility.8 2
75. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1033 (2d Cir. 1982); Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1982), cer. denied sub nom. City Trust v.
Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
76. See 13 WIJLLAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5965, at 155 (perm. ed. 1991). Cases of this type in-
clude ones in which plaintiff alleges that most directors had personal economic
interests in the challenged transaction-interests in conflict with those of the
shareholders. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1983);
Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1980); In re
Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973); Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 924-25 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 539 A.2d
180 (Del. 1988).
77. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785-87 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982). This more liberal standard permits a finding of futility whenever a
substantial number of directors has participated in approving the underlying
transaction. See, e.g., Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371 (1975) (excusing de-
mand where a majority of directors allegedly participated in and approved of
acts involving bias and self-dealing by minority); Miller v. Kastner, 473
N.Y.S.2d 656 (App. Div. 1984) (mem.) (futility established where defendant
majority shareholder had power to remove other directors).
78. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 reporter's note 1 (demand
cases "continue to divide, and each state jurisdiction tends to have a different
formula."); see, e.g., Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 107 N.W.2d 226
(Minn. 1961) (board's inactivity excuses demand); Miller, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 656
(futility where defendant majority shareholder had power to remove other
directors).
79. Delaware's position on corporate law issues usually has a significant
impact on other jurisdictions eager to benefit from the Delaware courts' busi-
ness acumen. Block et al., supra note 13, at 480.
80. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991).
81. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
82. In fact, several recent federal court decisions applying Delaware law
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Commentators have almost universally criticized the judi-
cial confusion surrounding the various applications of the futil-
ity exception.8 3 The volume of shareholder derivative suits
clogging court dockets has been surprisingly high, especially
during the 1980s. Distressingly, most of these actions turned on
the definition of futility rather than on a substantive examina-
tion of the alleged wrongdoing.84
3. Universal Demand
In light of the recurring dissatisfaction with the futility ex-
ception's unnecessary prominence in shareholder derivative
suits, the modern trend has been decidedly towards requiring
pre-suit demand in virtually every instance.8 5 Commentators
have almost unanimously supported such a move for many
years.86 In fact, both the ALI8 7 and the American Bar Associa-
found "reasonable doubt" excusing demand under circumstances that might
not have constituted futility in Delaware state court. See RCM Sec. Fund, Inc.
v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1330-35 (2d Cir. 1991) (reasonable doubt existed
where corporate benefits had no reasonable relation to enhanced costs from
challenged transaction); Brickman v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 101, 106-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reasonable doubt existed that a majority of directors were in-
terested); see also Block et al., supra note 13, at 474-75 (describing how the Ar-
onson decision prompted courts nationwide to consider more frequently the
underlying allegations in determining futility).
83. The ALI recently expressed its criticism in the following way:
All these [futility] formulations are somewhat inexact and reflect
a largely outmoded view of the function of the demand rule. If the
test is simply whether all directors are named as defendants, plaintiffs
will predictably frame their complaint in exactly this manner in order
to avoid the demand requirement. The exception would then swallow
the rule. Similarly, excusing demand whenever a majority of the
board is alleged to have been negligent could trivialize the demand
rule. Finally, [asking] whether demand on directors would "prod
them to correct a wrong" assumes that there is a wrong to be cor-
rected. The director's antagonism to an action may well be justified
and flow from a sound judgment that the action is either not meritori-
ous or would otherwise subject the corporation to serious injury.
ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. d. at 653.
84. The ALI has suggested, however, that while case law on demand has
been very unclear, "even the most cursory examination of the cases suggests
that courts have regularly considered the merits of the action (in addition to
the composition and involvement of the board) in determining whether to re-
quire or excuse demand." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08 cmt. a, at 117 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988) [herein-
after ALI 1988 TENTATIVE DRAFr].
85. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 reporter's note 1. The only via-
ble excuse to pre-suit demand would be a showing of irreparable injury. See
id. reporter's note 4. No court cases to date have interpreted this particular
point. Id.
86. See, e.g., Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequi-
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tion S advocate universal demand.
The Corporate Governance Project articulates the principal
policies supporting universal demand.8 9 First, and perhaps
most importantly, universal demand eliminates much of the
troublesome threshold litigation regarding application of the fu-
tility doctrine.90 In addition, demand is indisputedly easy to
make.91 Considering the many advantages often cited in sup-
port of demand,92 the benefits seem to outweigh the minimal
site to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 754 (1960) (stating that irrepa-
rable injury alone should excuse demand).
87. Section 7.03 of the ALI's Proposed Final Draft requires that share-
holders first make written demand upon the board, requesting that it either
prosecute the action or take suitable corrective measures. ALI FINAL DRAFT,
supra note 9, § 7.03(a). The demand itself must describe "with reasonable
specificity... the essential facts" supporting each claim. Id. The only excuse
obviating the pre-suit requirement would be "a specific showing that irrepara-
ble injury to the corporation would otherwise result." Id. § 7.03(b). In such
instances, plaintiff must still make a demand "promptly after commencement
of the action." Id.
88. Section 7.42 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides that:
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action; and (2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was
made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the de-
mand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable in-
jury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of
the 90 day period.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 7.42 (1991). Florida and Georgia have adopted
the Model Act's universal demand approach. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.0741(2) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-742 (Michie 1989).
89. The drafters of § 7.42 of the American Bar Association Section of
Business Law Committee on Corporate Laws' Model Business Corporation Act
articulated similar policies. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.42 official
cmt. (1991); Block et al., supra note 13, at 484-86; Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertain-
ing to Derivative Proceedings, 44 Bus. LAW. 543 (1989).
90. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 655. Judge Easter-
brook highlighted this significant concern in a recent federal decision:
In practice the futility exception to the demand rule has produced
gobs of litigation. It is this exception that has sapped the potential
role of the demand requirement as an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism. Hundreds of cases opine on whether demand is or is not
futile. Difficulties in sorting cases into demand-required and demand-
excused bins are not worth incurring, once we sever the link between
demand and the standard of review ....
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1344 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
91. In other words, "making demand on the board is a relatively costless
step" and "places little burden on the plaintiff." ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra
note 9, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 655.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 59-70. Even in circumstances in
which the board is arguably disqualified due to interest, the corporation still
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time and effort required. Third, universal demand arguably
simplifies the standard for judicial review.93 Delaware, for ex-
ample, varies the applicable review standard depending upon
whether the plaintiff can establish futility.94 The ALI openly
criticizes Delaware's double standard, finding no logical connec-
tion between demand futility and substantive judicial review.95
Although support for universal demand and its potential
benefits has been strong, some commentators still fear the un-
known, concerned that courts might take advantage of a fluid
situation to substitute their business judgments for those of
management. 96  Indeed, the adoption of universal demand
would necessarily create a fluid situation in places like Dela-
possesses a possibly beneficial range of options when faced with demand. Af-
ter all, the interested board may appoint a disinterested subgroup of the board
or create a special litigation committee to address the shareholder concerns.
Thus, requiring pre-suit demand to a biased board is not necessarily futile and
may in fact yield fruitful results. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03
cmt. e, at 657.
93. Id. at 655-56.
94. In a demand-excused setting, Delaware allows the court to substitute
its business judgment for that of the corporation. See infra text accompanying
notes 159-65. If demand is required, the Delaware approach essentially applies
the business judgment rule. Id.
95. ALl FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.03 cmt. e, at 655-56 (noting that
the link between demand and judicial review is unfortunate since the issues
are "logically very distinct"). Judge Easterbrook similarly criticized Dela-
ware's two-prong approach recently:
When the standard of review depends on the existence of a demand,
plaintiffs have extraordinarily strong reasons not to make a demand,
and corporations extraordinarily strong reasons to insist on one. De-
mand then becomes a threshold issue in every derivative suit, one
that must be resolved in advance of discovery and on the basis of a
good deal of speculation about what the board might do .... [Tihe
plaintiff will assert that the board is unreasonable. Why ask persons
with closed minds? The board will proclaim that Solomonic wisdom
would be applied if only plaintiff would ask, while simultaneously as-
serting that the suit has no conceivable merit. It is not a pretty pic-
ture, but it is an extended and expensive one, made more so by some
peculiarities in the way Delaware phrases its standards.
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1990) (advo-
cating that federal common law adopt universal demand), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1711
(1991). The Supreme Court's reversal required federal courts to follow the ap-
plicable state demand requirement, rather than federal common law. Since
the decision was limited to the conflict of laws question, the Supreme Court
declined to address the wisdom of adopting the universal demand rule
"[w]hatever its merits as a matter of legal reform." 111 S. Ct. at 1720. In fact,
the Supreme Court did acknowledge the "high collateral litigation costs associ-
ated with the demand futility doctrine." Id. at 1721.
96. See Block et al., supra note 13, at 486, 508 (stating that universal de-
mand rule might be beneficial, but that such a change should not be made at
the expense of the appropriate standard of review).
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ware that currently link demand to judicial review. Without
any remaining distinction between demand-required and de-
mand-excused cases, courts in such jurisdictions would have to
find alternate criteria for determining which suits deserve
closer scrutiny. They would have to face directly the more deli-
cate and appropriate inquiry of what is the appropriate stan-
dard of review when corporate management rejects a
shareholder's demand.
C. JUDICIAL REvIEw OF MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE TO
SHAREHOLDER DEMAND
1. Management's Response: Special Litigation Committees
and the Specter of Structural Bias
Although the legal history of the board of directors' power
to end derivative litigation is complex, most jurisdictions agree
that plaintiffs in demand-required cases97 face dismissal absent
proof that management's rejection of the shareholder demand
was wrongful.98 Prior to the development of special litigation
committees nearly two decades ago, this rule did not greatly
hinder plaintiffs. Even in demand-required cases, courts were
often willing to review the merits of plaintiff's allegations when
considering whether management's rejection was wrongful. 99
Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, corporate manage-
ment began using special litigation committees to fend off
shareholder derivative suits.-00 Once a shareholder filed suit,
the board would create a committee' 01 of supposedly disinter-
ested directors to investigate the plaintiff's claims and recom-
mend action. The appointed committee would, "after a suitable
97. Obviously, in demand-excused cases, an interested board's post-suit re-
jection of plaintiff's contentions would carry no weight. See DENNIS J. BLOCK
ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DI-
RECTORS 497 (3d ed. 1989) (courts have historically held that directors may not
terminate cases alleging that a majority of the board breached a fiduciary
duty). Prior to the creation of special litigation committees, many regarded
shareholder demand as "little more than a formal requirement" and excuse
was readily shown. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 reporter's note 5,
at 762.
98. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 reporter's note 4, at 760-61.
99. See id. at 761-62; see also Note, supra note 86, at 759-60 & n.81 (noting
that in deciding whether management's refusal to sue was reasonable, court
may consider the merits of plaintiffs allegations).
100. CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.2.3, at 645.
101. The committee might have two or three members, usually directors.
Sometimes the committee may contain a non-director "consultant" such as a
retired judge or law professor. See id.
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display of investigative activity and collective deliberation,' 10 2
produce a report concluding that the derivative suit was not in
the corporation's "best interest.'10 3 Based on that finding, the
corporation would then move to dismiss the lawsuit.10 4 In
Burks v. Lasker,0 5 the Supreme Court agreed that a disinter-
ested'0° group of corporate directors could terminate pending
derivative litigation. 0 7 This case buttressed the trend among
management defendants of appointing special litigation com-
mittees to consider the issues raised in derivative suits.'0 8
The growth of special litigation committees has had a sub-
stantial impact on shareholder derivative litigation. Manage-
ment's use of this device has motivated courts to find demand
futility only infrequently and to defer to the committee's deter-
mination more often.'0 9 This effect, which renders the plain-
tiff's position particularly difficult, could virtually eliminate
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (holding that disinterested directors of an invest-
ment company could unilaterally dismiss an action filed under the Investment
Company Act and Investment Advisors Act). The first case to approve ex-
pressly the special litigation committee procedure was Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418
F. Supp. 508, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10
reporter's note 2, at 759.
106. The "disinterested" requirement obviously excludes those who finan-
cially benefitted from the subject transactions, but it may not necessarily ex-
clude even named defendants not having a financial stake in the outcome. 1
MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17 at 59; see Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778,
782-83 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). Case decisions indicate
a judicial inclination not to find a prohibitive interest unless the committee
member is a "hard-core malefactor or a significant target of the derivative ac-
tion." 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17, at 59.
107. The termination must be consistent with state law and the underlying
policy considerations of the applicable federal law. See 441 U.S. at 486.
108. Interestingly, the vast majority of states has not even considered the
availability or the legitimacy of the special litigation committee procedure.
ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.08 reporter's note 2, at 706. By early 1992,
the only states having statutes specifically authorizing the procedure were
Alaska, Indiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Virginia. Id; see also BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 97, at 503-06 (describing statutory provisions). One jurisdiction
has apparently rejected the legitimacy of so-called special litigation commit-
tees. See Miller v. Register & Trib. Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983)
(en banc) (holding that corporate directors may not delegate to certain special
litigation committees the power to determine the corporation).
109. In other words, courts will more likely apply the business judgment
rule's presumption of deference to insulate management using the special liti-
gation committee device. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 reporter's
note 5, at 762.
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shareholder derivative litigation altogether.110
Some commentators cite the "common cultural bond,"
"natural empathy," and "collegiality" most directors share to
argue that special litigation committees are structurally biased
in favor of management, making their "independence" inher-
ently more apparent than real. 1 After all, making an adverse
judgment about a colleague's behavior is "distasteful at best."'1 2
Particularly if management selects the committee after suit has
been instigated, the highly-charged circumstances motivate de-
fendants to hand select committee members most sympathetic
to the cause.113 From the committee member's perspective, one
can readily imagine an eagerness to "curry favor with" fellow
directors or with the business community generally.114
Some reject the structural bias theory as "pop-psychology,"
an unprovable hypothesis that broadly and illogically attributes
interested motives to all corporate directors. 1 5 Arguing that
the theory, if true, lacks any rational ending point,116 these
commentators criticize the structural bias theory as undermin-
ing the integrity and independence generally recognized and
appreciated in outside directors.117
Regardless of the theory's validity, plaintiffs' allegations in
practice virtually never impress special litigation committees; in
only a handful of cases has a committee recommended anything
other than discontinuance of the action." 8 In doing so, the
110. See Cox, supra note 12, at 961 (describing special litigation committees
as the 'latest threat" to derivative suits).
111. Id. at 962; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry:
Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal
Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Direc-
tors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?,
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1980).
112. Cox, supra note 12, at 962.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Block et al., supra note 13, at 505; Michael P. Dooley & E. Nor-
man Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law
and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw. 503, 534 (1989).
116. Block et al., supra note 13, at 534-35 (asserting that structural bias the-
ory suggests a wholesale abandonment of the business judgment rule).
117. Id. at 535; see also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979) (noting
that outside directors are intended to be helpful "watchdogs" in Investment
Act cases).
118. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17, at 58 & n.13; Cox, supra note 12, at
963 (noting that after more than a score of special litigation committee cases,
all but one committee concluded that the suit was not in the corporation's best
interest); Jerold S. Solovy et al., The Role of Special Litigation Committees in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 864, 864 (1990).
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committees usually recount the same generalized and con-
clusory justifications for dismissal. 19 Thus, regardless of the
extensive commentary and court opinions championing the im-
portance of permitting corporate management the opportunity
to evaluate shareholder allegations fully and fairly,120 the sta-
tistics seemingly belie that lofty sentiment.12' Given the oppor-
tunity to consider plaintiff's grievances, management will, most
typically, flatly reject the plaintiff's concerns.
2. The Business Judgment Rule: Management's Usual
Presumption of Protection
The business judgment rule creates a presumption that cor-
porate directors make business decisions "on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken [is]
in the best interests of the company."'122 The rule's hallmark is
that "a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational
business purpose.' "'123 This common law principle dates back
more than 150 years'24 and arguably meets four basic goals.
12 5
First, the business judgment rule encourages competent indi-
119. These justifications include concerns that the derivative action's con-
tinuation would undermine employee morale, create an adversarial relation-
ship between the board and management, create public stigmatization and loss
of goodwill, and result in corporate liability for indemnification and related ex-
penses. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 reporter's note 8, at 765; see
also Kon S. Kim, The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business
Judgment Rule in the Shareholder Derivative Suit- An Alternative Frame-
work, 6 J. CoRp. L. 511 (1981).
120. See, e.g., Block et al., supra note 13.
121. In fact, apparently because of the difficult procedural barriers under-
lying derivative suits, such actions have become relatively rare. See Michael P.
Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 510 n.185
(1992); Romano, supra note 40, at 84.
122. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted));
see also Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Although once believed to be virtually impenetrable, the business judgment
rule has recently left management surprisingly vulnerable. See, e.g., Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (gross negligence creates personal
liability).
123. 493 A.2d at 954 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)).
124. Block et al., supra note 13, at 489-90 (quoting Percy v. Millaudon, 8
Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829) ("The test of [directorial] responsibility should be,
not the certainty of wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary
knowledge.")).
125. Id. at 490-91.
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viduals to serve as corporate directors.'2 6 Second, the rule also
gives directors the broad discretion to formulate company pol-
icy without fear of judicial second-guessing. 2 7 Third, the rule
protects courts from becoming embroiled in complex corporate
matters12s Finally, the business judgment rule ensures that
management remains in the hands of directors, rather than
shareholders, perhaps "protecting stockholders from
themselves.' ' 2 9
Plaintiffs can overcome the presumption of good business
judgment only by establishing that the directors acted either in
bad faith or in a grossly negligent fashion. The difficulty of
meeting this burden often means that the application of the
business judgment rule effectively determines the litigation's
outcome.13
0
Corporate management is not, however, always entitled to
the business judgment rule's important protections. Because of
the "omnipresent specter" that the board may act primarily for
itself instead of for the corporation and its shareholders, "there
is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule
may be conferred.' 31 Thus, when management decisions re-
quire directors to confront conflicts of interest, making objec-
tive resolution difficult, the court will not presume good
business judgment until the board initially establishes its good
faith and reasonable investigation. 32
One significant example of corporate management's height-
ened burden is in the context of responding to challenges to
corporate control. 3 3 The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal
126. See Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D.
Ill. 1989), affd, 897 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1990).
127. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d. 250, 256 (7th
Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
128. See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th
Cir. 1989). In fact, "[courts) are admittedly ill-equipped to handle" sophisti-
cated corporate decision making. Block et al., supra note 13, at 490.
129. Dooley & Veasey, supra note 115, at 522.
130. See Block et al., supra note 13, at 491 (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989)).
131. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
132. See id. at 955.
133. Interestingly, the ALI considered and rejected the application of Uno-
cal's enhanced business judgment rule to management's conduct when block-
ing hostile tender offers. See ALl FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 6.02 cmt. a, at
549-50 (§ 6.02 significantly varies from the "so-called Unocal test" by placing
burden on person attacking management's actions). Challenges to manage-
ment's handling of control transactions, however, do require the board to es-
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Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.13 held that:
... before the business judgment rule is applied to a board's adoption
of a defensive measure, the burden will lie with the board to prove (a)
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed; and (b) that the defensive measure adopted was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Directors satisfy the first
part of the Unocal test by demonstrating good faith and reasonable
investigation.135
Directors carry a heightened burden, according to the Delaware
court, 36 because their conduct in defending against takeovers
bears the implicit appearance of self-interest. Because effective
takeover defenses help corporate boards remain entrenched,
courts naturally fear that the directors' desire to retain control,
rather than concerns for shareholders' welfare, might motivate
the directors' conduct.' 37
3. Current Standards of Review
a. Overview
Considerable confusion surrounds the appropriate degree
of judicial scrutiny to apply when reviewing management's re-
spose to a shareholder's demand. Derivative litigation usually
implicates two levels of management conduct. The first level,
alleged management wrongdoing, 3 8 forms the basis for the
shareholder's complaint. The second level, which has more fre-
tablish that it was adequately informed, that it was disinterested and acted in
good faith, and that it rationally believed its action to be in the corporation's
best interests. Id. § 6.01 cmt. e, at 531-37.
134. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Unocal case involved a selective stock
repurchase in the face of a two-tier, highly coercive tender offer coupled with
the threat of greenmail. Id. at 956. Despite the court's adoption of a height-
ened standard, the board met its burden and escaped liability. Id. at 958-59.
135. Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990)
(citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946). The court does not substitute its business
judgment for that of corporate management; rather, the court works to ensure
the disinterested and reasonable environment in which the business decision
was reached. Id. at 1153. Management can more easily establish good faith
and reasonable investigation by showing that "a board comprised of a majority
of outside independent directors" approved the underlying decision. Unocal,
493 A.2d at 954-55.
136. Other jurisdictions have been unwilling to follow Delaware's lead.
Shortly after the Unocal decision, several states adopted statutes ensuring the
application of the standard business judgment rule even in takeover contexts.
See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(f) (1992); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (1992);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(d) (1992).
137. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980);
Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975); see also ALI
FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 6.02 cmt. a, at 548-51.
138. Of course, shareholder derivative litigation can involve allegations
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quently dominated derivative litigation for more than a decade,
involves management's decision when faced with a shareholder
demand. Judicial review turns on the issue of whether courts
should limit their inquiry to the second level or proceed to eval-
uate the underlying merits. Because courts generally prefer to
defer to management's business judgment, 139 and management
routinely uses special litigation committees, judicial inquiry has
been deflected almost exclusively into the second level.
Two main positions emerge out of the considerable litiga-
tion generated on this second level.140 The so-called "minimal-
ist position"' 41 applies the traditional business judgment rule,
thereby permitting only minimal review of management's re-
sponse to a shareholder demand. The second major approach is
Delaware's bifurcated test, which essentially applies the busi-
ness judgment rule in demand-required cases, yet permits
courts to supplant the committee's business judgment in de-
mand-excused cases.142 Several relatively recent decisions 143
have adopted moderate approaches somewhere between the
Delaware and minimalist approaches. Finally, the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act now reflects a slight variation on the def-
erential business judgment rule standard of review. Each
approach will be examined in turn.
b. The Deferential Business Judgment Rule Standard
Many courts follow the deferential business judgment rule
approach to reviewing management's response to a shareholder
demand.'" As expressed in the oft-cited New York case
Auerbach v. Bennett,145 the inquiry is confined to an examina-
tion of the board's independence and good faith, areas tradition-
against third parties, but the typical case is one against corporate insiders. See
supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
139. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
140. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.2.3, at 646.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
144. According to recent commentary, approximately half the states apply
the business judgement rule standard of review, at least in cases in which
shareholder demand is excused as futile. See Block et al., supra note 13, at
492-97; see also Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 55 (Mass. 1990) (listing courts fol-
lowing Auerbach v. Bennett); Cox, supra note 12, at 973 (noting that most
courts adhere uncritically to the business judgment rule when they review the
special litigation committee's recommendation).
145. 47 N.Y.2d 619 (1979); see Cox, supra note 12, at 973 (stating that
Auerbach reflects "quintessential expression" of business judgment rule
doctrine).
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ally subject to review under the business judgment rule. 46
Although this inquiry permits challenges to the special litiga-
tion committee's procedures, 147 the business judgment rule
shields the substantive bases for the committee's recommenda-
tion from any judicial inquiry.148
This minimalist treatment handles management's rejection
of derivative suit demands just like any other business deci-
sion.149 The plaintiff must overcome the business judgment
rule's presumption that management acted properly in re-
jecting the shareholder demand. 50 Consequently, the business
judgment rule becomes management's most potent defense to
derivative suits.,' Through it, the special litigation commit-
tee's business discretion ironically enables management to dis-
patch derivative actions alleging illegal or oppressive board
conduct, even though the business judgment rule would nor-
mally not apply to a board decision in such a setting. 52
Not surprisingly, corporate counsel have largely endorsed
146. 47 N.Y.2d at 623-24.
147. Id.
148. See Cox, supra note 12, at 973. The nature of the underlying conduct
is not directly at issue:
[The decision] ... not to pursue the claims advanced in the sharehold-
ers' derivative actions ... falls squarely within the embracp of the
business judgment doctrine, involving as it did the weighing and bal-
ancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, fis-
cal and other factors familiar to the resolution of many if not most
corporate problems.... Thus, the courts cannot inquire as to which
factors were considered by that committee or the relative weight ac-
corded them in reaching that substantive decision.
Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 633.
149. The Supreme Court has described this business decision as follows:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a
cause of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordina-
rily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of
the directors .... Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion
intra-vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of
misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a
dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment
United Copper Secs. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917).
150. Plaintiff meets this burden by establishing that the decision maker
was interested, acted in bad faith, or was so ill-informed as to be grossly
negligent.
151. 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17, at 57.
152. Id. at 58. Courts have struggled with the application of the insulary
business judgment rule to derivative lawsuits challenging particularly egre-
gious management misconduct. As one commentator put it, "Courts [do] not
want to give carte blanche either to the corporate crook or to the strike suit
artist." Id. at 60.
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the Auerbach approach, arguing that the business judgment
rule should protect management's decision to discontinue deriv-
ative litigation.153 Given the important policies surrounding the
application of the business judgment rule in routine business
law cases,'5 this support is understandable. In addition, as a
unitary approach, it does reflect desirable simplicity in
application.
The business judgment rule's simplicity, however, comes at
too high a price. First, many contend that corporate manage-
ment does not deserve the rule's protection in the derivative
suit setting. Critics of Auerbach often cite the structural bias
doctrine, contending that inherent bias necessarily taints man-
agement's hand-picked decision-making body and makes a dis-
interested recommendation virtually impossible. Although this
theory obviously does not establish actual bias in every situa-
tion,1-55 it reasonably suggests the appearance of bias for the
reasons suggested earlier.15 6 In any event, regardless of the
structural bias doctrine's viability, statistics show that litigation
committees almost inevitably reject shareholder demands while
ritualistically using conclusory and generalized justifications for
dismissing the derivative suits.15 7
Moreover, given the nature of derivative litigation, the
business judgment rule imposes too substantial a barrier on
plaintiffs lacking the necessary tools to meet that burden. The
rule operates to protect management's recommendation, a layer
removed from the alleged wrongdoing. The plaintiff share-
holder accordingly must refute the business judgment of con-
duct separate from that underlying the lawsuit-conduct
orchestrated by corporate management and peculiarly within
its realm. Shareholders lack access to the facts necessary to
undercut the litigation committee's protected business
judgment.
Thus, although the traditional business judgment rule
makes good sense in a variety of corporate law contexts, it is
too deferential to management in derivative suits. The devel-
opment and use of special litigation committees has exacer-
bated an already difficult situation. Although commentators
153. See ALI FINAL DRAFr, supra note 9, § 7.10 reporter's note 7, at 765; see
also Duesenberg, supra note 65, at 312 (defending "expansive application" of
business judgment rule).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
157. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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have cautioned about the "death knell" of derivative litigation
due to procedural constraints for almost fifty years,158 those
fears may now be coming to fruition. The business judgment
rule, when coupled with the special litigation committee device,
may eliminate the derivative remedy altogether.
c. Delaware's Demand-Dependent Bifurcated Standard
Judicial review under Delaware's relatively complex, bifur-
cated standard varies depending on whether the shareholder
establishes futility of demand. Often called the "demand re-
quired, demand excused" rule,159 the standard applies the def-
erential business judgment rule in cases requiring demand,160
but permits broader scrutiny if demand is excused.' 6 ' In
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,162 the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that it would uphold the board's decision in demand-ex-
cused cases if the special litigation committee established its in-
dependence and good faith in thoroughly investigating the
alleged misconduct, giving a reasonable basis for its conclusions,
and the court, in the discretionary exercise of its own business
judgment, determined that dismissal was in the corporation's
best interest. 63
Recognizing the beneficial deterrent impact of bona fide
derivative actions, the court sought a balancing point between
appropriate stockholder power to bring corporate causes of ac-
tion and the corporation's ability to eliminate detrimental liti-
gation.' 64 The court rejected a more deferential approach
158. See Hornstein, supra note 40.
159. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 cmt. a, at 729.
160. See id. Noting that shareholders lack any independent, absolute right
to continue a derivative suit for breach of fiduciary duty over the corporation's
objection, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981), the Zapata
court concluded that it should respect board decisions to dismiss a derivative
suit in demand-required actions-so long as the board decision was not wrong-
ful. Id. at 784.
161. To establish futility, plaintiff shareholder must show either that a ma-
jority of the board is "interested" or that the pleadings support a reasonable
doubt that the challenged transaction was the product of valid business judg-
ment. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 cmt. a, at 728.
162. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
163. Id. at 789.
164. Id. at 786-87. As one commentator has noted, "the court attempted to
walk a middle line between giving unrestricted authority to directors to dis-
miss such actions regardless of their merit, and permitting plaintiff sharehold-
ers to bring and control such suits regardless of their lack of merit." 1
MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17, at 60.
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because of the "abusive potential of structural bias."'165 A small
number of other jurisdictions, following Delaware's always im-
pressive lead, have adopted the Zapata two-pronged test. 66
Almost unanimously, however, academic commentary has
criticized the "demand required, demand excused" distinction
applied in Zapata.167 Many courts have also been critical, not-
ing the practical difficulties posed by layering the judiciary's
business judgment onto the already burdensome process of
sorting out minority shareholder rights.168 Critics also contend
that conditioning different levels of review depending on the
presence of futility of demand only motivates shareholders to
assert that demand is always futile in hopes of procuring judi-
cial review of the underlying allegations.169
165. Cox, supra note 12, at 975. The Zapata court voiced its structural bias
concerns in the following manner:
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this in-
stance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee
members. The question naturally arises whether a "there but for the
grace of God go I" empathy might not play a role.
430 A.2d at 787.
166. Federal courts construing Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, and Vir-
ginia law have also followed the Zapata approach; see BLOCK ET AL., supra
note 97, at 522.
167. ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 reporter's note 7, at 764-65 (cit-
ing extensively to legal commentary); see, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 975 (not-
ing that Zapata's two-tiered analysis provides only an "illusory improvement"
over the business judgment rule). Commentators advocating heightened judi-
cial scrutiny, however, were initially excited that Zapata's inquiry permitted
greater review than the overprotective business judgment rule. See id. at 974
& n.57; E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of
Directors' Business Decisions, 37 Bus. LAW. 1247, 1266, 1273 (1982) (commend-
ing Zapata as the end of judicial abdication).
168. See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 511-12 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 499 A.2d
1184 (Del. 1984) (criticizing Zapata for "setting up a form of litigation within
litigation"); see also 1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17, at 68 (discussing
Kaplan).
169. The shareholder's dilemma has been described as follows:
Given the continued viability of the Zapata rationale, plaintiff
should consider whether it might not be better to ignore making a de-
mand on the board of directors and allege that such a demand would
be futile.... [S]uch a tactic gives the plaintiff two bites at the apple.
First, he can challenge the independence and good faith of the deter-
mination. Second, he may find that the judge, while grudgingly ac-
knowledging the independence and good faith of the board seeking
dismissal of the action, differs with their business judgment and re-
fuses to dismiss the case anyway ....
1 MAGNUSON, supra note 29, § 8.17, at 66-67.
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d. Miscellaneous Standards Attempt a Balance
Facing the choice of applying either an Auerbach-type busi-
ness judgment rule or a Zapata-type two-pronged analysis,
some jurisdictions have rejected both in favor of their own vari-
ations. The trend appears to be towards heightened judicial in-
quiry on the merits, at least in demand-excused cases.170 In
each of these jurisdictions, the courts permit greater review
than the deferential business judgment rule would allow.
Some courts even extend the inquiry beyond Zapata.
For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Alford
v. Shaw'71 adopted a "modified Zapata rule,"'172 endorsing
"thorough judicial review" before dismissing or settling a share-
holder derivative suit.173 Rejecting the more deferential busi-
ness judgment rule,174 the court permitted an extensive inquiry
into the special committee's report, as well as all the other facts
and circumstances underlying the plaintiffs allegations.175 Ex-
ceeding Zapata, this broad standard applies in both demand-re-
quired and demand-excused cases.176
Massachusetts permits less extensive review. In Houle v.
Low,177 a demand-excused case,178 the court determined that
the corporation bears the burden of establishing the litigation
committee's independence, lack of bias, good faith, and the
thoroughness of its investigation.179 Even if the corporation
shows that the committee's process was fair, the court still
must determine whether the committee reached a reasonable
170. See Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325-26 (N.C. 1987); Note, Deriva-
tive Actions-Presumed Good Faith Deliberations by Special Litigation Com-
mittees: A Major Hurdle for Minority Shareholders-Alford v. Shaw, 22
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 127, 139-44 (1987).
171. 358 S.E.2d at 323.
172. Id. at 326.
173. Id.
174. Interestingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Alford initially
decided to adopted a modified Auerbach approach, then opted to permit a
broader inquiry. Withdrawing its earlier decision, which had been reported at
349 S.E.2d 41 (1986), the court rejected "slavish adherence to the business
judgment rule," expressing concern about the inherent structural bias under-
lying corporate committee decisions. 358 S.E.2d at 326.
175. 358 S.E.2d at 328.
176. Id. at 327. At one point, the ALI complimented the "relative wisdom
of AUfrd's approach." See ALI 1988 TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 84, § 7.08
cmt. a, at 119.
177. 556 N.E.2d 51 (Mass. 1990).
178. Id. at 53 n.3.
179. Id. at 58.
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and principled decision.180 Although Massachusetts law does
not allow the court to substitute its own business judgment, as
the Zapata standard permits, the review does involve an evalu-
ation of the substantive merits of plaintiff's allegations.181
The Alford and Houle approaches suggest interesting twists
on an old theme, but neither one provides the delicate balance
essential to judicial review of management's response. First,
the North Carolina rule, which is broader than the Zapata ap-
proach, permits judicial review of the underlying merits in
every instance. This tips the scale too far in the plaintiffs'
favor by allowing no deference to even a reasoned, disinter-
ested, good faith committee recommendation to dismiss. The
Houle standard, in contrast, appears more balanced, but since
the Houle case involved demand futility, it would not provide
the necessary guidance if universal demand were to become the
rule.
e. Model Business Corporation Act § Z44: A New Look for
an Old Rule
The Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") only re-
cently specified how a court should handle corporate manage-
ment's rejection of a shareholder demand.'8 2 Pursuant to
section 7.44(a), the court shall dismiss the derivative proceeding
on the corporation's motion if management's decision maker 8 3
"determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable in-
quiry'84 on which its conclusions are based that the mainte-
180. Id. at 59.
181. Id. Plaintiff can "point out factors not considered by the committee"
or show "why those relied upon by the committee do not support its conclu-
sion." Id. Interestingly, in formulating this standard, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court cited the earlier unitary standard of review initially adopted
by the ALl. See id. (citing ALI 1988 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 84, § 7.08).
A recent Tennessee case adopts a similar standard, but applies it in both de-
mand-required and demand-excused cases. See Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215
(Tenn. App. 1992) (requiring management to establish "committee's indepen-
dence, good faith, and procedural fairness, as well as the soundness of the com-
mittee's conclusions and recommendations").
182. See MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 7.44 official cmt. (1991).
183. Sections 7.44(b) and (f) specify what groups can make management's
determination. The corporation can appoint a disinterested "panel" of in-
dependent directors, § 7.44(b), or the court may appoint one, § 7.44(f). The
§ 7.44 procedures, however, are not exclusive; in some instances, a decision to
commence an action may fall within a corporate officer's authority depending
upon the claim amount and the identity of potential defendants. See Id. § 7.44
official cmt.
184. The ABA deliberately chose the word "inquiry" rather than "investi-
gation" to make it clear that the scope of the court's review "will depend upon
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nance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of
the corporation. '185 The burden of proving these requirements
depends upon the independence of the corporation's decision
maker. If a majority of the board was independent when the
board made the determination, the plaintiff bears the burden;
otherwise, the corporation must establish management's good
faith and reasonableness.18 6 The shareholder bears the initial
burden on the issue of whether the board is not independent.18 7
The MBCA's new review standard essentially applies the
old business judgment rule to protect the determination of dis-
interested boards acting in good faith and with due care. 88 The
Model Act eliminates the business judgment rule's deferential
presumption, however, if the shareholder can prove the board's
lack of independence. By shifting the burden depending on the
independence of the corporate decision maker, the MBCA re-
tains the demand-required, demand-excused distinction of the
Zapata approach. Unlike Zapata, however, the Model Act
never permits the court to substitute its own business judgment
for that of the corporation-even in a demand-excused setting.
The MBCA's unitary standard provides a pleasing simplic-
ity, but restricts judicial inquiry too greatly. The Model Act fa-
vors management insofar as shareholders always bear the
initial burden of convincing the court that the corporate deci-
sion maker was not independent. If the shareholder fails to
meet that burden, then the plaintiff must additionally establish
that the directors' determination was not in good faith or that
the inquiry was not reasonable. Although this approach pro-
the issues raised and the knowledge of the group making the determination
with respect to the issues." Id. § 7.44 official cmt., at 205.
185. Id. § 7.44(a). The section "does not authorize the court to review the
reasonableness of the [corporate decision maker's] determination." Id. § 7.44
official cmt., at 208. Rather, it limits judicial review "to whether the determi-
nation has some support in the findings of the inquiry." Id. Both the decision
maker's inquiry and determination must be in good faith. See id. at 205-06. In
evaluating the quality of that inquiry, the court should consider "the spirit and
sincerity with which the investigation was conducted, rather than the reasona-
bleness of its procedures or basis for conclusions." Id. at 206 (quoting Abella v.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982)).
186. See Id. § 7.44(e).
187. Id. § 7.44 official cmt., at 207; see also Consumers Power Co. Derivative
Litig., 132 F.R.D. 455, 464 n.27 (E.D. Mch. 1990); Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertain-
ing to Derivative Proceedings, 44 Bus. LAW. 543, 553 (1989).
188. See 132 F.R.D. at 465 (MBCA treats dismissal recommendation as cor-
porate business judgment); Block et al., supra note 13, at 499-501 (MBCA's
business judgment rule standard consistent with current law).
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vides slightly more flexibility than the Auerbach traditional
business judgment rule standard, the MBCA does not go far
enough. To the extent courts abandon the Delaware approach
in favor of MBCA section 7.44, shareholders will find the main-
tenance of derivative suits even more difficult than before.
II. JUGGLING DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES: THE ALI'S
PROPOSALS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The general considerations underlying the Corporate Gov-
ernance Project include the basic belief that, while derivative
suits can enhance corporate accountability, private enforcement
has social costs that sometimes outweigh the benefits.18 9 As a
result, the ALI assigns derivative actions only a limited role in
assuring corporate accountability1 90 and concludes that certain
fundamental principles should delimit such suits. First, the
ALI distinguishes between cases involving duty of care and
duty of fair dealing.191 In essence, the ALI concludes that due
care cases demand less judicial intervention, finding that such
cases rarely yield a significant recovery to the corporation,192
and that other means of accountability are available.193 In con-
trast, actions alleging a breach of the duty of fair dealing re-
quire closer judicial scrutiny.194
The ALI's next guiding principle is the need for "expedi-
tious means for screening and dismissing non-meritorious litiga-
tion (but without overbroadly precluding meritorious actions as
well).' 95 Similarly, for actions surviving this efficient screen-
ing process, the ALI seeks to evaluate the suit's overall impact
on the corporation by focusing on "the board or committee's
evaluation of the action, not simply the plaintiff's
allegations.' 96
Thus, the ALI, like others, attempts to "steer a middle
189. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
190. ALI FINAL DRAFr, supra note 9, intro. note at 588-89.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 589; see id. reporter's note at 592-96 (examining empirical evi-
dence relating to recovery).
193. Id. at 589-90.
194. Id. at 590. The ALI authorizes heightened substantive review because
of the "greater need for judicial oversight in an area where other mechanisms
of accountability may be less able to prevent unfair self-dealing and other po-
tential fiduciary abuse." Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 591.
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course between excessive reliance on litigation remedies and
the abolition of any judicial recourse for the shareholder," not-
ing a special concern for "the danger of overdeterrence and the
impact of even the potential risk of litigation on the willingness
of outside directors to serve.1 97 Acknowledging the turbulent
past two decades of shareholder derivative litigation, the ALI
hopes to smooth and focus that judicial turbulence. 98
B. DUELING STANDARDS
Throughout the initial Tentative Drafts, the ALI advocated
a unitary standard' 99 of judicial review for shareholder deriva-
tive suits. That standard focused on one central inquiry-
"whether the board or committee reasonably concluded, based
on adequately supported findings that the court deems to war-
rant reliance, that dismissal was in the best interests of the
corporation."2 0 0
The Proposed Final Draft, however, reflects an about-face
197. Id.
198. The ALI expressed its goals regarding the development of meaningful
judicial review as follows:
In overview, the law governing derivative litigation has under-
gone a period of volatile fluctuations over the last two decades.... [A]
decade ago dismissals of derivative actions based on the board's rejec-
tion of the action were unusual. Within recent years, however, this
mode of dismissal has become more and more frequent, and in some
jurisdictions substantive judicial review of the basis for such dismissal
is only authorized under special and limited circumstances. Although
[this project] does not seek to reverse the trend toward use of board
or committee review and evaluation as a basis for dismissal, it does
aim to ensure that this procedural mechanism will develop and frame
the central issues in the litigation for judicial examination in a man-
ner that is both reliable and efficient. The end result should be that
the board's or committee's determinations serve as a procedural vehi-
cle by which an early screening of the action's probable merit and its
likely impact upon the corporation is achieved.
Id. at 591-92.
199. Interestingly, some confusion exists regarding whether the ALI truly
considered the initial standard to be unitary. Although the Reporters recently
characterized the approach as "unitary," see Memorandum from the Reporters
for Corporate Governance to Members of the American Law Institute 9
(March 24, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reporters' Memorandum],
the comments to Tentative Draft No. 8, in describing the arguably "unitary"
approach of § 7.08, stated that: "Section 7.08 is premised on the judgment that
this issue cannot be satisfactorily resolved by any mechanical or unitary
formula, because it depends heavily on the relative need for a litigation rem-
edy, which differs depending on the context and the legal rights at issue."
ALI 1988 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 84, § 7.08 cmt. c, at 120.
200. Reporters' Memorandum, supra note 199, at 9; see also ALI 1988 TEN-
TATIVE DRAFT, supra note 84, § 7.09(b).
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on the substantive standard of review. The new bifurcated
standard varies the level of judicial review depending upon the
nature of the plaintiff's underlying allegations. The Reporters
summarized these significant changes for the ALI members
before the annual meeting in May 1992:
Under this bifurcated standard: (i) If the gravamen of the complaint
is that the defendant violated either a duty under Part IV (Duty of
Care) other than a knowing and culpable violation of law, or a duty
under Part V (Duty of Fair Dealing) that would be reviewed under
the business judgment rule in the absence of a board or committee
recommendation, then the substantive standard of review of the board
or committee recommendation should also be the business judgment
rule. (ii) In other cases governed by Part V, or to which the business
judgment rule is not applicable, including cases involving a knowing
and culpable violation of law, the substantive standard of review of a
board or committee recommendation is whether the board of commit-
tee "reasonably determined" that dismissal is in the best interests of
the corporation, based on grounds that the court deems to warrant
reliance. 201
The ALI bases this bifurcated approach "on the traditional dis-
tinction between the minimal role of the courts in relation to
business decisions, on the one hand, and their greater role in
matters involving alleged self-dealing, on the other."20 2
Before delving more deeply into the complexities of the
ALI's bifurcated standard, it should be noted that as a thresh-
hold matter the ALI elsewhere provides another, simpler basis
for determining the applicable standard of review. Section 7.07
focuses on the defendants' identities. For actions against third
parties-persons 20 3 other than directors,20 4 senior executives, 20 5
those controlling the corporation,206 or an associate20 7 of any
such person-the court will apply the business judgment rule208
201. Reporters' Memorandum, supra note 199, at 9-10.
202. ALI F NAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10 cmt. c, at 730. The ALI sup-
ports this approach in part by its conclusion that derivative suits historically
have been "more effective, and less controversial, in enforcing the duty of fair
dealing than the duty of care." Id. This perhaps is "because litigation is often
the only practical recourse where substantial self-dealing is involved, while
market and other forces have proven more effective in promoting" adherence
to duty of care. Id. at 730-31.
203. Id. § 1.28 (defining "person").
204. Id. § 1.13 (defining "director").
205. Id. § 1.33 (defining "senior executive").
206. Id. § 1.08 (defining "persons in control").
207. Id. § 1.03 (defining "associate").
208. Section 4.01 addresses the application of the business judgment rule.
That section provides that directors and officers have fulfilled their duty to
the corporation if they (1) are "not interested.., in the subject of the business
judgment; (2) [are reasonably well] informed with respect to the subject of the
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to management's determination 0 9 that a shareholder action
should be discontinued. Citing a "trilogy of Supreme Court de-
cisions," 210 the Reporters conclude that shareholder suits to
compel corporate action against third parties are not significant
to the overall system of corporate governance. 21 1 Thus, since
"little basis exists for a court to dispute the judgment of the
board,"2 2 the ALI advocates a "minimal standard"213 of judicial
review in this context.
The vast bulk of shareholder derivative suits, however,
proceed beyond the threshhold, since they involve actions
against corporate insiders rather than third parties. For these
more serious suits, "[s]ection 7.08 outlines an integrated frame-
work for judicial review of a decision by a board, or a commit-
tee thereof, to seek dismissal of a derivative action brought in
the name or right of their corporation. 2 14 The outline provides
that the court should dismiss a derivative suit at the behest of
management if the board or delegated committee, having fol-
lowed the procedural requisites of section 7.09,215 determines
business judgment... [and] (3) rationally believ[e] that the business judgment
is in the best interests of the corporation." Id. § 4.01(c). Anyone challenging a
director's or officer's conduct bears the burden of establishing that manage-
ment did not act within the above guidelines. See id. § 4.01(d).
209. The business judgment rule applies regardless of whether the deter-
mination was by the board or by an appointed committee. See id. § 7.07(a)(1).
210. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903);
Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
211. According to the ALI Reporters:
Boards are better equipped and positioned than are courts to deter-
mine whether litigation against a stranger to the corporation is justi-
fied. In addition, litigation against a person other than a senior
corporate official generally has little significance to the overall system
of corporate governance. Actions against such strangers to the corpo-
ration neither enable shareholders to hold management accountable
nor perform any other oversight function that management cannot be
relied upon to carry out in a superior fashion.
ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.07 cmt. c, at 698-99.
212. Id. at 698.
213. Id. at 699.
214. Id. § 7.08 cmt. a, at 703.
215. Section 7.09(a) sets forth
four prerequisites to an objective [judicial] inquiry... : (1) a disinter-
ested decisionmaker 'capable of objective judgment under the circum-
stances'; (2) the assistance of counsel and other agents as may be
reasonably necessary ... ; (3) an evaluative process that meets the
standard[s of] § 7.10; and (4) the preparation of a [writing detailing]
the... determinations ... sufficient[ly] to enable meaningful judicial
review.
Id. § 7.09 cmt. a, at 708-09. If the board or committee does not satisfy these
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that the action is contrary to the corporation's best interests,
and management's determination satisfies the standard of re-
view set forth in section 7.10.
In most derivative suits, therefore, the complex standards
of review found in section 7.10 will apply. Section 7.10 is the
heart of the ALI's proposed judicial standard of review, cover-
ing more than forty pages in the Final Proposed Draft.2 1 6
Under this section, courts must first consider whether dismissal
would permit a defendant (or associate) to retain a "significant
improper benefit."217 If so, the court will not dismiss based on
a board or committee motion seeking dismissal.21 8 If, however,
the action does not involve retaining an improper benefit, the
applicable standard of review will depend on the character of
the alleged misconduct-whether the "gravamen" of plaintiff's
claim relates to duty of care or duty of fair dealing.219 A looser
procedural requirements, the court "should permit" an opportunity to rectify
the situation. Id. § 7.09(b).
216. See id. § 7.10, at 725-66.
217. Id. § 7.10(b). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the de-
fendant retaining the significant improper benefit "possesses control.., of the
corporation," or that the benefit was obtained fraudulently or without advance
authorization or the requisite ratification. Id.
218. Although plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of an
improper benefit, the corporation can still obtain dismissal by showing that the
suit's continuation would cause severe corporate injury that "convincingly out-
weighs" any injury to the public interest from dismissal. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The AL Corporate Governance Project, N.Y. L.J., June 9, 1992, at 1, 5, 6 n.21
(noting that this test reflects amendments approved on the floor of the 1992
Annual Meeting).
219. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10(a). More specifically, the
ALI states in § 7.10(a)(1) that the business judgment rule should apply to the
board's or committee's determinations whenever
the gravamen of the claim is that the defendant violated a duty set
forth in Part IV (Duty of Care), other than by committing a knowing
and culpable violation of law, that is alleged with particularity, or if
the underlying transaction or conduct would be reviewed under the
business judgment rule under §§ 5.03, 5.04, 5.05, 5.06, 5.08, or 6.02.
Id. § 7.10(a)(1). Thus, courts should apply the business judgment rule in a va-
riety of settings, mainly involving "Part IV" violations of duty, which are es-
sentially problems of neglect and mismanagement. The ALI Reporters
describe the important protections afforded by the business judgment rule in
the following way:
The basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is that
corporate law should encourage, and afford broad protection to, in-
formed business judgments (whether subsequent events prove thejudgments right or wrong) in order to stimulate risk taking, innova-
tion, and other creative entrepreneurial activities. Shareholders, with
expectations of greater profit, accept the risk that an informed busi-
ness decision - honestly undertaken and rationally believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation - may not be vindicated by sub-
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standard of review, the business judgment rule, will apply to
ordinary duty of care cases, whereas greater scrutiny is permit-
ted for duty of fair dealing cases.220
Several basic assumptions underlie this dual structure.
First, the ALI Reporters conclude that duty of fair dealing vio-
lations represent a more serious threat to the integrity of the
corporate system than violations of the duty of care.221 Simi-
larly, the ALI finds the potential for litigation abuse to be
"much lower" in self-dealing situations, "because self-interested
transactions occur less frequently."222  As a result, the ALI
willingly advocates more rigorous controls for duty of loyalty
problems.
The heightened review standard for duty of loyalty cases is
sequent success. The special protection afforded business judgments
is also based on a desire to limit litigation and judicial intrusiveness
with respect to private-sector business decisionmaking.
Id. pt. IV, intro. note a, at 176. After all, the directors' and officers' duty of
care is "to act carefully in fulfilling the important tasks of monitoring and di-
recting the activities of corporate management." Id. pt. IV, intro. note c, at 179
(quoting The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW 1591, 1599-1600
(1978)). In addition, § 7.10 triggers the business judgment rule's application
when the underlying "misconduct" is the authorization or ratification of cer-
tain management decisions, or consists of conduct on behalf of management
"associates" or actions blocking unsolicited tender offers. These include exec-
utive compensation decisions, use of corporate property or position to obtain
financial benefit, taking advantage of corporate opportunities, and acts in com-
petition with the corporation. See id. §§ 5.03-06, 5.08, 6.02.
Pursuant to § 7.10(a)(2), a different, more stringent standard applies to
"other cases governed by Part V (Duty of Fair Dealing) or to which the busi-
ness judgment rule is not applicable." Id. § 7.10(a)(2). In contrast to the duty
of care cases, duty of fair dealing claims implicate the "basic principle ... that
the director should not use his corporate position to make a personal profit or
gain other personal advantage ... ." Id. pt. IV, intro. note c, at 179 (quoting
The Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra, at 1599-1600). Duty of loyalty
claims include "fraud, self-dealing, misappropriation of corporate opportuni-
ties, improper diversions of corporate assets, and other similar matters" impli-
cating conflicts between management's interest and the corporation's welfare.
Id. at 179-80. In addition to the duty of fair dealing cases, the heightened stan-
dard also applies to any "knowing and culpable violation of law in breach of
Part IV's" duty of care. Id. § 7.10(a)(2).
220. See id. The ALI formulated this dual standard upon reaching the fol-
lowing judgments about two "competing considerations": first, "[e]arly review
and screening of derivative actions" is essential to avoid undesirable incentives
for plaintiff to bring suits possessing only marginal merit; and second, judicial
review of corporate management's decision is also essential to ensure that
their fiduciary obligations remain meaningful. Id. cmt. c, at 730.
221. Id. § 7.10 cmt. d, at 732.
222. Id. at 733. In contrast, duty of care concerns are "constant and perva-
sive" in business, "and some business decisions will necessarily prove unwise."
Id.
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actually the same unitary standard that the ALI Reporters ad-
vocated for all cases through the earlier Tentative Drafts.223
Under section 7.10(a)(2), "the court should dismiss the action if
the court finds... that the board or committee was adequately
informed under the circumstances and reasonably determined
that dismissal was in the best interests of the corporation, based
on grounds that the court deems to warrant reliance. ' 224 In es-
sence, "the court is... looking to whether dismissal of the ac-
tion would be fair to the corporation. '225 This standard of
review focuses on management's reasoning in requesting dis-
missal226 and may take account of structural and procedural
matters underlying the decision.227 In addition, the court must
evaluate whether management's determinations "warrant reli-
ance."228  Thus, courts must engage in more probing inquiry
than a simple application of the business judgment rule.229
Rather than requiring de novo consideration or detailed judicial
fact-finding, however, this standard contemplates flexible judi-
cial scrutiny, which may include examination of a variety of
specified factors.230
C. PLAINTIFFS' FORMIDABLE BURDENS OF PROOF
As a result of these dueling standards and other provisions
included in the Proposed Final Draft, plaintiffs proceeding
under the ALI's recommended approach face multiple, formi-
dable burdens of proof. They first must meet a heightened
pleading requirement added as a last-minute amendment to
223. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
224. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.10(a)(2).
225. Id. § 7.10 cmt. e, at 737.
226. Section 7.10(a)(2) requires that the reviewing court receive the actual
justifications for the decision, rather than letting the court speculate about
what those justifications might have been. See id. at 738.
227. Id.
228. Id. § 710(a)(2).
229. See id. § 7.10 cmt. f, at 740.
230. These factors include:
(1) whether the issue involved is one of law or fact and whether busi-
ness considerations are primarily involved; (2) the plausibility of the
reasons given for dismissal in the report of the board or committee;
(3) the adequacy of the board's or committee's investigation (where
the facts are unknown or uncertain); (4) the involvement, or lack
thereof, of the board in the challenged transaction or incident; and,
most of all, (5) the nature of the underlying claim (i.e., whether it in-
volves conduct or a transaction as to which the defendant bore the
burden of proving fairness).
Id. cmt. e, at 739.
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section 7.04 at the ALI's annual meeting in 1992.231 Plaintiffs
must plead particular facts raising a "significant prospect 232
that the alleged conduct is unprotected by the business judg-
ment rule or by subsequent approvals.233 In addition, should
the corporation inform the plaintiffs that disinterested direc-
tors have rejected their demand, then the plaintiffs can avoid
dismissal only by alleging particularized facts that negate the
corporation's statement of disinterest or establish that the re-
jection failed to satisfy the business judgment rule or was not
reasonably in the corporation's best interests.234 The plaintiffs
are not entitled to discovery to help them uncover the particu-
larized facts necessary to meet section 7.04's heightened plead-
ing requirements. 235
Once past this pleading requirement, the plaintiffs still
must overcome the business judgment rule's presumption in
management's favor should the court determine, in a case in-
volving the duty of care, that judicial review pursuant to sec-
tion 7.10(a)(1) is appropriate. Even in a duty of loyalty case
demanding heightened judicial scrutiny, the corporation will
sometimes enjoy the protection of the business judgment
rule.236 Here, at least, upon the appropriate showing, the plain-
tiff is entitled to limited discovery before the corporation's dis-
231. The ALI's acceptance of the "Smith Amendment" was a compromise
reached between warring factions at the annual meeting. See ALI Wraps Up
Corporation Law Project[,] Works on Lawyer Ethics, Complex Trials, supra
note 17, at 2728; Coffee, supra note 218, at 1; Barnaby J. Feder, A Brawl
Breaks Out Over Corporate Law, N.Y. TMES, May 8,1992, at D6.
232. Professor John Coffee, the ALI reporter on this matter, acknowledges
that the interpretation of "significant prospect" is unclear on its face. Profes-
sor Coffee has indicated that the commentary to this section will disclose a
balancing approach under which weak allegations will require relatively weak
justification for rejection, and stronger allegations will demand something
more substantial. See Coffee, supra note 218, at 1.
233. See ALI FiNAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.04(a) (plaintiff must state
facts showing "that the conduct or transaction complained of did not meet the
applicable requirements of Parts IV (Duty of Care and the Business Judgment
Rule), V (Duty of Fair Dealing), or VI (Role of Directors and Shareholders in
Transactions in Control and Tender Offers) in light of any approvals of the
conduct or transaction communicated to the plaintiff by the corporation").
234. See Coffee, supra note 218, at 6 (setting forth text of amended § 7.04, a
"convoluted sentence that only an indenture trustee could love").
235. Id.
236. For example, if a disinterested board rejects a corporate opportunity
after appropriate disclosure, thereby permitting an insider to take advantage
of that opportunity, the business judgment rule protects the board decision.
Judicial review is pursuant to § 7.10(a)(1). See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note
9, § 7.10 cmt. f(ii), at 742-43; see also id. § 7.13(d) & cmt. d, at 784-85 (detailing
burdens of proof for plaintiffs and the corporation under various motions).
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missal motion is resolved.237
D. COMPETING PRESSURES PUSH THE PROJECT
During the fourteen years of the Corporate Governance
Project,238 divergent views pushed and pulled the creation of
the massive final product. Along the way, commentators de-
bated the relative merits of the proposed unitary standard,
which some thought gutted the important protections of the
business judgment rule239 and others thought made key ad-
vances towards allowing essential judicial oversight.240 In addi-
tion, some commentators criticized the ALI's emphasis on the
distinction between duty of care cases and duty of loyalty cases
as misplaced.241 Still other commentators followed the project
237. Id. § 7.13(c). Plaintiff must demonstrate "that a substantial issue ex-
ists whether the applicable standards" have been met and that the information
is not otherwise available "without undue hardship." Id.
238. ALI President Roswell Perkins has written an in-depth discussion of
the origins and purposes of the Corporate Governance Project. See Roswell B.
Perkins, The Genesis and Goals of the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 661 (1987); see also Donald E. Schwartz et al., Genesis: Panel
Response, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 687 (1987) (panel discussion regarding Corporate
Governance Project's origins, goals, and progress).
239. See, e.g., Block et al., supra note 13, at 504-07 (stating that the ALI's
proposed judicial review would discourage directors from serving and would
cause overcautious decision making); Dooley & Veasey, supra note 115, at 514-
15 (ALI's proposals would strip board of important protections and would re-
sult in intrusive judicial inquiry); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the
Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 52-54 (1987) (ALI approach
fails to deter frivolous suits); Bryan F. Smith, Corporate Governance: A Direc-
tor's View, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 273, 291 (1983) (ALI approach would require
too much of busy directors); E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Critical-
ity of the Counselor's Role, 45 Bus. LAw. 2065, 2074 (1990) (ALI "exalts con-
cepts of structural bias and departs significantly from traditional business
judgment rule treatment"); see also ALI Wraps Up Corporation Law Project[,]
Works on Lawyer Ethics, Complex Trials, supra note 17, at 2727 (noting that
lawyers aligned with the business community objected throughout the Corpo-
rate Governance Project).
240. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 994-1011 (endorsing ALI objectives and
urging more flexible standards for judicial review); Perkins, supra note 238, at
680 (unitary standards provide important judicial flexibility); Schwartz, supra
note 238, at 689 (ALI struck proper balance between burdens and benefits of
derivative suits); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law
Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927, 943-46 (1983).
241. Interestingly, even the earlier "unitary" standard reflected that dis-
tinction. See ALI 1988 TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 84, § 7.08(c). Commen-
tators have attacked this distinction, arguing that directors are not likely to
approach the two types any differently and that the two categories sometimes
blur. See Block et al., supra note 13, at 507; Dooley & Veasey, supra note 115,
at 540; see also Dooley, supra note 121, at 508 (criticizing the distinction as ill-
founded and difficult to apply).
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with less enthusiasm, finding that the ALI proposals only re-
flected current law.
Even the Proposed Final Draft, with its more conservative
bifurcated standard, continues to spark controversy. At the
ALI's sixty-ninth annual meeting in May 1992, corporate practi-
tioners threatened to "outbalance" other factions during the
all-important vote.242 Representatives of the Business Round-
table sought to amend the Proposed Final Draft to substitute a
business judgment standard that would apply to all termination
decisions.2 3 The New York Times predicted that the various
business law factions would undoubtedly "brawl" at the annual
meeting.244 Ultimately, however, the ALI overwhelmingly ap-
proved the Principles of Corporate Governance, subject to cer-
tain amendments supported by the Reporters.2 45 As Professor
Jonathan Macey pointed out, "the controversy surrounding the
project forced more democracy upon the ALI."246
With approval of the Proposed Final Draft, commentators
can now begin to weigh the pros and cons of the bifurcated re-
view standard. Some contend that the ALI proposals tip the
balance too far in management's favor, calling the outcome a
victory for the business lobby.247 These voices argue that the
242. In his letter to the ALI members on April 13, 1992, ALI President
Roswell B. Perkins stressed the importance of high attendance at the Corpo-
rate Governance Sessions, saying
A major campaign is underway to assure high attendance on May 12
and 13 by members who are corporate practitioners. Such an attend-
ance is to be applauded, since the corporate bar clearly has expertise
and special insights into the issues. However, it is important that this
effort not result in an imbalance of representation at the meeting.
The ALI has been built on the premise that generalists, such as
judges and general practitioners, and also practitioners and academics
who may concentrate in other fields, are critical in formulating bal-
anced Institute positions.
Accordingly, I urge that all members make every possible effort
to attend and to be present when the most important issues are dis-
cussed and voted on ....
Letter from Roswell B. Perkins, President of the American Law Institute, to
Members 1-2 (April 13, 1992) (on file with author).
243. Coffee, supra note 218, at 5.
244. See Feder, supra note 231, at D6.
245. Coffee, supra note 218, at 1.
246. Macey, supra note 14, at A21.
247. See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, Business Lawyers Win Showdown Vote in
ALl: Tough Line on Shareholder Suits, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1992, at 2. Pro-
fessor Coffee notes that although the derivative suit sections "had long been a
lightening rod for criticism from those who feared that it liberalized the stan-
dards," the "most original provisions... probably have the opposite impact."
Coffee, supra note 218, at 5.
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shareholder plaintiff faces overly rigorous hurdles at the plead-
ing stage and, even if that is surmounted, again when the corpo-
ration recommends dismissal.4
From the opposing perspective, some criticize the ALI's
recommendations as too pro-plaintiff. For example, Professor
Dooley contends that the ALI has effectively transferred ulti-
mate decision-making authority from the board "to any share-
holder willing to sign a complaint."24 9 Those seeking greater
management control generally prefer the universal application
of the business judgment rule, resisting the ALI's allowance of
heightened judicial scrutiny in duty of loyalty cases. 250
Professor John Coffee, who served as Reporter to the pro-
ject, calls the proposal "modest"; when responding to critics
who fear that the Draft permits too extensive a judicial inquiry,
he humorously chides that "Chicken Little's fears were more
realistic."5 1 Furthermore, even if the ALI compromise works
to plaintiffs' disadvantage, that might be viewed as "the price of
giving the board a serious role in the process before the plain-
tiff is permitted to conscript the corporation. '252
The ultimate impact of the ALI Corporate Governance
Project remains to be seen.2 53 Indicating its likely importance,
248. See Coffee, supra note 218, at 6. Another key concern is the absence
of discovery before plaintiff must meet the particularized pleading require-
ments. See id.; ALI Wraps Up Corporation Law Project,] Works on Lawyer
Ethics, Complex Trials, supra note 17, at 2728 (citing Professor Joel Seligman's
concerns that the enhanced pleading requirement, in the absence of discovery,
"would permit corporations to defeat meritorious claims").
249. Michael P. Dooley, Not in the Corporation's Best Interests, A.B.A. J.,
May 1992, at 45. Professor Dooley was also concerned that the ALI proposal,
by making the standard of judicial review somewhat dependent upon the na-
ture of plaintiff's allegations, puts too much power in the hands of plaintiff's
attorney. See id.
250. See Coffee, supra note 218, at 5.
251. John C. Coffee, A Watchdog for the Guardians, A.B.A. J., May 1992,
at 44.
252. Coffee, supra note 218, at 6. In any event, Professor Coffee believes
that the bifurcated standard ultimately preserves a greater measure of judicial
discretion by permitting the courts to get beyond mere procedural issues to the
substantive merits in the most important cases. Id.
253. Professor Coffee characterized this uncertainty as follows:
Now that the ALI Corporate Governance Project, which began in
1978, has completed its 14-year odyssey, should anyone care? Will it
have any impact, or sink like a stone in the deep sea of proposed legal
standards?... [I]s there any reason for the corporate lawyer to review
and become familiar with this 1000-plus page document, which cannot
claim to state the settled law of any specific jurisdiction?"
Id. Professor Coffee suggests that the Project's most significant effect proba-
bly is that it provides "the only authoritative, comprehensive codification of fi-
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however, some courts have already cited the derivative suit
sections.! 4
E. THE CONFUSING ALI COMPROMISE APPROACH: TIPPING
THE BALANCE TOWARD MANAGEMENT
Through its Corporate Governance Project, the ALI had a
unique opportunity to provide clarity and balance to share-
holder derivative litigation, a field long in serious disarray. Di-
vergent review standards result in uncertain judicial
application. The competing tensions underlying management
and shareholder rights create a see-saw battle in which courts
precariously juggle deference to management's business judg-
ments with a desire to permit substantive review of plaintiff's
allegations. The increased use and acceptance of special litiga-
tion committees has exacerbated the situation by virtually elim-
inating meaningful substantive review of shareholder
allegations.
Given the fragile, ailing condition of derivative litigation,2
55
the ALI faced an enormous task. Fourteen years in the mak-
ing, the Proposed Final Draft of the massive Corporate Govern-
ance Project has been long debated and awaited. The
Corporate Governance Project could have both resolved the
tremendous judicial confusion surrounding review standards
and provided a more even balance between management and
shareholder rights.2 6 Unfortunately, the Proposed Final Draft
effectively does neither. Its standards of review are so proce-
durally convoluted as to be unworkable, and are substantively
premised on faulty distinctions. Moreover, the ALI's recom-
mendations ultimately favor management to the detriment of
duciary duties to which either a court or a practitioner can turn today for
bottom line answers." I&; see also Perkins, supra note 238, at 683-84.
254. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664, 667 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988); Miller v. Register & Trib. Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 717
(Iowa 1983); Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 327 (N.C. 1987). Of course, these
cites were to the Tentative Drafts prior to the Final Proposed Draft released
in 1992.
255. See Cox, supra note 12, at 994-97 (characterizing the ALI project as a
thoughtful and sweeping review of what ails the derivative suit); John C. Cof-
fee & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit An Evalua-
tion and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 261, 261 (1981)
(declaring that the derivative suit "faces extinction").
256. Although the underlying purposes of the Project have been subject to
some debate, Reporters Coffee and Schwartz initially envisioned reforms that
would restrict the availability of special litigation committees while expanding
the court's watchdog role. See Cox, supra note 12, at 994; Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 255, at 326, 330-36.
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important shareholder rights.257
The unitary standard originally advocated by the ALI
would have permitted a court to dismiss a derivative suit if cor-
porate management reasonably concluded dismissal to be in the
corporation's best interests "[biased on adequately supported
findings that the court deems to warrant reliance .... "25 The
fact that the court could decide whether management's findings
warranted reliance heightened the judicial inquiry from mere
deference to an informed business judgment to a more search-
ing evaluation of the basis for management's determination.
The corporation had the burden of establishing the key ele-
ments, regardless of whether a disinterested body recom-
mended dismissal.2 59  This initial ALI proposal permitted
greater judicial scrutiny than either MBCA section 7.44 or
Auerbach, and it seemingly exceeded even the much-criticized
Delaware two-pronged approach. It permitted substantive in-
quiry into the underlying merits even in a case that Delaware
might normally view as demand-required. The ALI's unitary
standard, however, did not permit, as Zapata does, the whole-
sale substitution of the court's business judgment for that of
corporate management.
The ALI's original proposal contained much to commend.
It applied universally to all types of derivative actions260 and re-
tained the flexibility necessary to permit the courts important
discretion in a variety of settings.26 1 This flexibility to examine
whether management's recommendation warranted reliance
would presumably permit judicial review of the underlying al-
legations even if the committee could show that it acted reason-
ably and in a disinterested fashion. For this very reason,
business interests attacked the proposed unitary standard as
257. The shareholder derivative sections do, however, provide a compre-
hensive overview of the current legal approaches. This itself is an important
contribution to the existing commentary underlying shareholder derivative
issues.
258. ALI 1988 TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 84, § 7.08(b).
259. See id. § 7.11(b). Plaintiff did bear the burden if attempting to estab-
lish the retention of an improper benefit pursuant to § 7.08(d). See id.
260. The earlier Tentative Drafts did retain, however, the distinction be-
tween suits against third parties and those against corporate insiders. See id-
§ 7.07.
261. This flexibility did not come without guidance. For example, the ALI
listed expansive considerations that might justify management's recommenda-
tion, see id. § 7.08(b), and also suggested greater judicial deference in duty of
care settings, see id. § 7.08(c).
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permitting excessive judicial intrusion even beyond the hated
Zapata dual approach.
Ultimately, the ALI project opted for its two-pronged ap-
proach applying a different standard depending upon the "gra-
vamen" of the plaintiff's complaint. The ALI now reserves the
more intrusive "warrant[s] reliance" standard for cases impli-
cating the duty of fair dealing and applies the business judg-
ment rule in duty of care cases. Making the principal
distinction the difference between duty of care and duty of loy-
alty cases is a poor choice. Although the nature of defendants'
misconduct should play some role in judicial review,262 this fac-
tor should not control the applicable standard. For one thing,
in a multiple allegation case, the gravamen may not be readily
understood. Very few cases involve pure violations of due care
without implicating the duty of loyalty.263 Rather than wal-
lowing in difficult futility determinations, courts will instead
find themselves litigating and relitigating what constitutes the
gravamen of a shareholder's complaint. In addition, the distinc-
tion might well motivate clever pleaders to find a colorable
claim of self-interest in virtually every setting. Even if courts
are able to resolve this threshhold characterization issue, the
distinction lacks compelling support. The injury to plaintiff
shareholders is just as palpable when directors breach their
duty of care as it is when they violate their duty of loyalty.
Moreover, it may not be rational to assume that management's
determination will more likely lack integrity in breach of loy-
alty cases than in other types of conflicts.264
Another flaw in the ALI's final proposed standard is the
burden plaintiffs face due to their diminished opportunity for
discovery. As the debate at the ALI's annual meeting re-
flected,265 there was considerable support for permitting plain-
tiffs some limited discovery before requiring detailed pleadings.
Management controls all relevant facts in the corporate setting;
262. For example, the nature of the underlying allegations could be one
factor when considering whether the committee acted reasonably and in the
corporation's best interests. In fact, the ALI's earlier drafts treated the due
care/duty of loyalty distinction in this manner. See id § 7.08.
263. See Dooley, supra note 121, at 508 (noting that there are very few
"pure" due care cases).
264. Professor Michael Dooley expressed this conclusion in the following
colorful manner: "Unless one assumes that cheating is a communicable dis-
ease against which only judges have been inoculated, the nature of the individ-
ual actor's conduct is not a sufficient reason to change tribunals and transfer
the traditional authority of independent directors to the courts." Id. at 506.
265. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff shareholders will be hard-pressed to support their sus-
picions with particularized facts in the absence of discovery.
The actual applicable standard of judicial review may be a moot
question if the plaintiff cannot produce adequate particularized
pleadings.
Finally, from a practical perspective, the multi-layered
rule, which is cross-referenced over numerous sections and de-
scribed in more than one hundred pages, will be extremely dif-
ficult to interpret and apply. In its effort to be comprehensive
and to cut a compromise across diverse business interests, the
ALI has created a virtually unworkable set of interrelated stan-
dards that raises more questions than it answers. The sections
themselves are sometimes difficult to follow, 266 and the refer-
ences to other sections equally lengthy and complex will likely
make application of these standards quite daunting. Should a
court face multiple claims raising both duty of due care and
duty of loyalty issues, one can only imagine the difficulties of
tracking the appropriate standards through the ALI provisions.
Although the actual impact of the ALI's recommendations
may not be clear for years,267 one result is immediately appar-
ent. The Corporate Governance Project represents an opportu-
nity lost. Rather than clarifying muddied legal doctrine that all
too often keeps plaintiff shareholders out of court because of ir-
rational procedural restrictions, the ALI recommendations
themselves lack clarity and allow the delicate balance between
management and shareholder rights to slip too far in the corpo-
rate board's favor. The difficult political climate in which the
ALI operated may explain the Corporate Governance Project's
convoluted compromise. After all, the business lobby
threatened to vote for the more deferential business judgment
rule standard had the ALI Reporters not been flexible enough
to accommodate corporate management's concerns. 268 Cer-
tainly, a unitary business judgment rule standard would be far
worse than the flexibility now permitted under section 7.10.
Unfortunately, the daunting burdens imposed on plaintiffs sig-
nificantly undercuts that flexibility. Thus, the ALI standards
fall far short of expectations, but this result may have been the
unfortunate price of achieving a compromise acceptable to all
ALI factions.269
266. See, e.g., supra note 234.
267. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text accompanying note 243.
269. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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III. ACHIEVING A MEANINGFUL BALANCE BETWEEN
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND STRIKE SUITS
A. THE FRAMEWORK FOR CREATING IEANINGFUL REVIEW
The intricate balance to be struck between management's
ability to govern and a shareholder's right to accountability
looms large in the 1990s. 270 The ingenious and uniquely com-
plicated remedy that is shareholder derivative litigation lies in
disarray. As this Article demonstrates, the tensions underlying
derivative suits have created a diverse assortment of inconsis-
tent standards relating to shareholder demand and judicial re-
view. Every jurisdiction requires demand, yet most excuse the
requirement under unpredictable circumstances. 271 Special liti-
gation committees have developed into a uniquely powerful
voice for corporate boards seeking dismissal of derivative suits,
yet the judicial review of committee recommendations ranges
from total deference to nonrecognition.272 Given this perplex-
ing legal treatment, shareholder derivative suits may not be
dead, but their value is at least seriously diminished.273
Nonetheless, shareholder derivative litigation does have
unique significance and must be encouraged so long as its at-
tendant costs are reasonably monitored and contained. Deriva-
tive suits supply a special opportunity that general shareholder
litigation does not offer. Although the role of derivative litiga-
tion should not be idealized, this extraordinary remedy has
been the last and only resort of shareholders seeking to redress
corporate wrongs. Unless shareholders retain an effective
270. Three commentators recently described this significant controversy:
As the 1990s begin, the business judgment rule's application to
the demand requirement and to decisions by disinterested directors
acting in good faith and with due care to refuse such shareholder de-
mands remains the focus of considerable discussion by academics and
commentators, and in courtrooms, state legislatures, and boardrooms.
The ultimate resolution of the rule's proper role in shareholder litiga-
tion will in large measure determine the extent to which shareholder
grievances concerning corporate decisions that go awry or which do
not please all shareholders will be resolved by directors elected by the
majority of the corporation's shareholders, and to what extent such
disputes will be decided by the courts at the behest of minority
shareholders.
Block et al., supra note 13, at 469.
271. See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
273. See generally Cox, supra note 12, at 959-60 ("Like the heroine in a
Saturday matinee, the derivative suit has repeatedly appeared to be at the
cliffs of disaster .... [The] latest threat to the derivative suit is the special
litigation committee .... ").
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method for judicial review of alleged corporate wrongdoing, no
remedy will exist. Corporations, as separate entities created by
the states to generate and carry out commerce throughout this
country, deserve some meaningful mechanism for preventing
managerial pillaging. Derivative suits specifically target con-
duct that exclusively injures the corporation itself; they protect
this state-generated entity that lacks a voice of its own.2 7 4
Equally valuable, however, are the significant policies sup-
porting the business judgment rule and the corresponding con-
clusion that courts should defer to management's business
judgment that derivative actions be dismissed. Unwarranted
judicial intrusion is ineffective and undesirable for corporations
and courts alike. A proposed review standard must accommo-
date management's legitimate concerns, as well as those of
plaintiff shareholders.
Regardless of which side of the debate seems more sup-
portable in theory, statistics demonstrate that management al-
most inevitably rejects shareholder demands, and shareholders
bring derivative suits only infrequently.27 5 Assuming, then,
that the balance has swung out of shareholders' reach, any new
substantive standard should allow greater meaningful judicial
intervention while preserving the important principle of per-
mitting corporate management to reach informed business
judgments without undue interference.
Apart from seeking a substantive balance between the two
key competing interests, an improved standard should meet
certain important procedural goals as well. For example, a
standard of judicial review should reflect clarity and ease of ap-
plication. A clear and straightforward rule encourages ready
adoption by the courts, as well as predictable and effective ap-
plication. These goals appear to support a unitary over a multi-
pronged standard. Perhaps the best example of how a unified
rule can resolve unnecessary judicial confusion in the context
of shareholder derivative suits is the recent movement towards
universal demand.
B. UNIVERSAL DEMAND: A DESIRABLE REFORM
NECESSITATING A NEW LOOK AT BALANCED REVIEW
The universal demand approach is now supplanting the fu-
274. Although other means of deterrence do exist, they do not eliminate
the need for the extraordinary remedy provided by derivative litigation. See
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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tility doctrine, after decades of struggle over the exception's ap-
plication and interpretation. 276 Important issues of corporate
governance have hinged on the procedural questions of
whether the shareholder first made an appropriate demand
and, if not, whether that demand was excused. The judicial
maelstrom swirling around these procedural points obscured
the more serious issues surrounding the claimed management
misconduct that gave rise to the litigation in the first place.
Since commentators and the courts have almost uniformly criti-
cized the morass of litigation surrounding the futility doctrine
in recent years, a unified procedural approach seems a natural
resolution.
Indeed, universal demand is the clear modern trend, and
strong policies support the new standard. As noted earlier,
many significant purposes support the making of demand,27
even if corporate management rarely responds supportively.278
The benefits outweigh the relatively low cost associated with
shareholders submitting a demand to the board. Eliminating
the futility exception reduces the tortured judicial inquiries in
this area, and accordingly necessitates a different judicial re-
view standard in those jurisdictions previously following the
much-maligned "demand required, demand excused" distinc-
tion.279 Both the MBCA and the Corporate Governance Project
adopt universal demand with a proviso that permits sharehold-
ers to avoid making a demand by showing irreparable injury.280
276. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
277. Courts endlessly stress the traditional notion that boards of directors
govern, and that courts should not needlessly displace their judgment. Thus,
allowing boards the first chance to address shareholder concerns makes good
sense from both a business and policy perspective. In addition, courts them-
selves would benefit from an approach that enlarges the possibility that busi-
ness disputes might be resolved short of the courthouse steps. See supra notes
59-69 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
279. Most commentators agree that judicial review should not hinge on
whether a shareholder sent a demand letter first to the board of directors. In
an absurd twist to an already ill-founded approach, shareholders can be penal-
ized for mistakenly making a demand where futility could have been shown.
Once demand is made, some courts have found a waiver of the futility excep-
tion and have applied the "demand required" standard of judicial review.
Although the Delaware approach arguably is designed to prevent interested
directors from benefiting from the business judgment rule, the anomalous
waiver result demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in even the best reasons
underlying this dual standard.
280. See MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1991); ALI FINAL DRAFr,
supra note 9, § 7.03. Although it is unclear what shareholders must demon-
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C. A PROPOSED STANDARD
With the universal demand approach leading the way for
substantial reform in shareholder derivative litigation, an effec-
tive review standard must now be created to complement the
new demand requirement's advantages. Reviewing the current
issues surrounding the appropriate standard of judicial review
makes apparent the need for radical change. Given the confus-
ing diversity of existing standards, the inconsistent range of
deference accorded management's decision that derivative liti-
gation must be discontinued, and the assorted bases separating
the applicable standards, it is no small wonder that derivative
suit participants face a puzzling and dissatisfying array of op-
tions. Assuming that a major change is necessary, then, the
next consideration is the appropriate form such change should
take.
Although the problems underlying judicial review in this
area are indeed complex, a unitary standard would best address
these complexities, absent some compelling argument support-
ing bifurcation. No such argument appears to exist. Assuming
that universal demand is the rule, review obviously can no
longer vary depending on whether shareholders are required to
present a demand to the board, as the Zapata standard in Dela-
ware now holds.281 Nor does the creation of a dual standard
based upon the "gravamen" of a plaintiff's claim, as the ALI ad-
vocates, appear optimal. The difficulties associated with sorting
out the "gravamen" reduces any advantages such an approach
might otherwise offer.
A modified business judgment rule may accommodate the
competing policies underlying shareholder derivative litigation.
The key feature of this proposal is that the corporation, not the
shareholder, would have to meet an initial burden of proof.
Courts would have to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit in
accordance with management's recommendation so long as the
corporation could establish that the decision maker acted rea-
sonably, in good faith, and in a disinterested fashion. This pro-
posed standard somewhat resembles the first prong of
strate, the option does allow the investor to resort to immediate court involve-
ment in the face of extraordinary circumstances.
281. The ABA somewhat retained this distinction through the burden-
shifting device in § 7.44. See MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 7.44 & official cmt.
2 (1991). Although the presence of self-interest can be important to judicial
review, it should not provide a separate basis for bifurcation.
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Delaware's Zapata rule.28 2 Unlike Zapata's second prong, how-
ever, the suggested standard would not permit the court to sub-
stitute its own business judgment for that of management.283
In determining whether the corporation has met its burden, the
court would be able to consider all relevant justifications for
management's determination, including the seriousness and
weight of the plaintiff's allegations. Naturally, the proposed
standard would omit the heightened pleading obligation appear-
ing in the amended MBCA section 7.04, opting instead for the
usual notice pleading requirements. This rule would protect
corporate management by disallowing judicial intrusion into
the substantive allegations except to the minimal extent neces-
sary for the corporation to meet its burden.
Placing the burden on the corporation makes good sense.
After all, corporate management possesses all the relevant in-
formation and facts surrounding the determination to discon-
tinue the derivative litigation. The corporation should be able
to present the requisite showing in a cost-effective manner. In
response to a shareholder's demand, the corporation will pre-
sumably conduct a reasonable inquiry assembling relevant un-
derlying facts.284 Moreover, the standards of good faith and
reasonableness are quite low and should be readily met. Given
the general judicial reluctance to meddle in the corporate
sphere, this proposed standard should not overly concern corpo-
rate practitioners.
The proposed review standard is also consistent with the
ALI's procedural rules requiring judicial oversight of derivative
suit settlements because of possible collusion among the par-
ties.28 5 Given that possibility of impropriety, the proponents of
settlement bear the burden of showing that it warrants ap-
proval and is consistent with public policy.28 6 The broad judi-
cial discretion underlying settlement approval has already been
used as the basis for extensive review of management's dismis-
sal recommendations.287
282. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981). See supra
notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
284. The ALI contemplates the necessity of a written report summarizing
the decision maker's considerations. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9,
§ 7.09(4) (management must prepare a written report sufficient to permit
§ 7.10 review). The MBCA does not require a written report. See MODEL
BusINEss CORP. ACT § 7.44 official cmt. 2.
285. See ALI FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9, § 7.14 cmts. a, c, at 797-800.
286. See id. reporter's note 1, at 808.
287. See Alford v. Shaw, 258 S.E.2d 323, 327 (N.C. 1987).
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The suggested standard, including the proposed corporate
burden, is also analogous to the "proportionality rule" seen
elsewhere in corporate law.288  Management's handling of
shareholder demands in derivative suits suggest an appearance
of bias similar to management's adoption of takeover defense
strategies when faced with the threat of takeover. Although
board decisions of this type have normally been subject to a
simple business judgment rule analysis, courts gradually have
become conscious of the potential bias of boards protecting
their own positions when defending against aggressor entities.
Acknowledging this inherent underlying conflict, the Delaware
court imposed a modified standard of review requiring the cor-
poration to establish its good faith, reasonableness, and more.28 9
In the derivative suit context, the appearance of bias should
similarly impose upon corporations the relatively benign bur-
den of establishing the business judgment rule prerequisites.
Although the business lobby will undoubtedly oppose this
proposed standard as too intrusive, a quick review of similar
concerns demonstrates that such fears are unfounded. For ex-
ample, despite numerous dire predictions following the Zapata
decision, no subsequent court following Delaware law has actu-
ally applied the much-dreaded second prong, which allows
courts to substitute their business judgment for that of the cor-
poration. Similarly, the application of the more onerous pro-
portionality rule in the takeovers context only rarely results in
a ruling against management.
Those supporting a heightened level of judicial inquiry will
likely criticize the proposed standard for not extending far
enough. After all, the rule does not permit review beyond the
procedural soundness of the corporate committee's decision to
recommend dismissal of the shareholder's suit. In almost all
instances, restricting review to that level does provide the best
possible result for the courts and for shareholders alike. Given
the high likelihood that management can meet its burden and
enjoy the business judgment rule's protection, the question re-
mains as to whether the court should retain some degree of
flexibility to pass on particularly egregious suits otherwise be-
yond reach. Despite this legitimate policy concern, the advan-
tages supporting the business judgment rule and a
straightforward review standard preclude caveats permitting
288. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
289. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985).
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heightened review in particular circumstances. 29°
Consistent with the desire for simplicity, the proposed
standard of review would remain constant despite the presence
of other variables. For example, the basic rule would not
change regardless of the gravamen of plaintiffs' claims. As a
practical matter, however, the inclusion of substantive self-in-
terest allegations should naturally make the corporation's bur-
den of proof more difficult to establish. In contrast, the
corporation could more easily show the reasonableness of its
decision maker's determination in the face of mere allegations
of corporate mismanagement implicating duty of care. Simi-
larly, this proposed standard would apply regardless of the de-
fendants' identities. On the one hand, where the defendants
are third parties rather than corporate insiders, management's
burden will be easily satisfied. On the other hand, claims
against management should necessarily make the corporation's
burden of proof more difficult. Thus, the one standard provides
the inherent flexibility essential to the broad range of possible
shareholder derivative claims.
At this point, given the divergent views espoused by the
ABA and the ALI, it is unclear what cues the courts will take.
Both well-respected bodies have strong effects on how judicial
opinion and legislation shape corporate law. Legal scholars and
practitioners alike may agree that the ultimate goal is to con-
struct a sophisticated procedural gate that permits meritorious
shareholder suits to proceed to the merits, while shutting out
strike suits. Unfortunately, in attempting to juggle the diverse
interests of corporate management and shareholders, the Cor-
porate Governance Project allows that gate to close too far. A
modified business judgment rule would provide the sensitive
balance satisfactory to the policy needs of both factions.
CONCLUSION
In this controversy-plagued area of the law, commentators
have quarreled for decades over the need for change and what
form change might take. In recent times, the American Bar
Association, through its Model Business Corporation Act, and
especially the American Law Institute, in its 1992 Corporate
Governance Project, have contributed thoughtful commentaries
290. An example of a caveat increasing judicial flexibility is the ALI's
§ 7.10(b), which permits plaintiff to avoid dismissal by establishing the reten-
tion of a significant improper benefit. ALl FINAL DRAFT, supra note 9,
§ 7.10(b).
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and meaningful suggestions about how shareholder derivative
suits might be handled and reviewed by the courts. Although
both suggestions provide helpful direction, neither one is on the
mark.
Assuming that courts must require universal demand of
shareholders, the appropriate judicial review of the corpora-
tion's subsequent refusal of that demand should be clear-cut
and must meet a delicate balance. Although the courts must
not encourage shareholder strike suits, they also must not dis-
courage meritorious derivative litigation from the courthouse
steps. The Model Act does not strike the appropriate balance;
it merely restates the status quo, protecting corporations under
the business judgment rule's shield whenever shareholders can-
not disprove management's independence. Although the ALI's
more recent proposals allow for broader judicial inquiry, the
suggested standards are so convoluted and the burdens imposed
on plaintiffs so rigorous, they make the recommendations un-
workable and undesirable.
By reviewing the corporate decision maker's determination
under this Article's proposed modified business judgment rule
should provide the appropriate unitary mechanism for satisfy-
ing the diverse policy tensions underlying this complex area of
business law. Restricting judicial inquiry to the procedural cor-
rectness of management's determination should satisfy the
business lobby's concerns that the courts not become too ac-
tivist in derivative suits. Shifting the burden to require the cor-
poration, not the plaintiff shareholder, to make the threshold
showing of reasonableness and disinterest should permit plain-
tiffs more meaningful access to the courts. Coupling this sug-
gested approach with universal demand should clarify and
redirect shareholder derivative litigation in very constructive
ways.
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